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Change and Transforlnation in Asian
Industrial Relations
SAROSH KURUVILLA and CHRISTOPHER L. ERICKSON*
We argue that industrial relations (IR) systems change due to shifts in the
constraints facing those systems and that the most salient constraints facing IR
systems in Asia have shifted from those of maintaining labor peace and stability
in the early stages of industrialization to those of increasing both numerical and
functional flexibility in the 1980s and 1990s. The evidence to sustain this
argument is drawn from seven "representative" Asian IR systems: Japan, South
Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, India, and China. We also
distinguish between systems that have smoothly adapted (Singapore, Malaysia,
and the Philippines) and systems that have fundamenta11y transformed (China
and South Korea) and hypothesize about the reasons for this difference.
JUDGING FROM THE ATTENTION PAID BY RESEARCHERS, it would
seem that the 1980s and 1990s were a period of change, turmoil, and even
transformation in industrial relations (IR) systems all over the world. Much
of this literature has been based on evidence from the advanced industrial
nations (e.g., Locke 1996; Katz 1993; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986;
Streeck 1988; Frenkel 1988; Bray and Haworth 1993; Armingeon 1994).
While there are dissenting views about whether IR has in fact transformed in
these nations (e.g., Golden, Wallerstein, and Lange 1997, Crouch 1993,
Hyman 1994) and there have been attempts to make distinctions between
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transformation and nonfundamental change (e.g., Erickson and Kuruvilla
1998a), there is broad agreement on the main factor driving these changes:
increasingly competitive environments caused by the integration of world
markets, as well as the direction of the change: decentralization of bargaining,
and a movement toward increased flexibility in wages, labor deployment, and
at the workplace level.
Relatively less attention has been paid to how IR systems have changed in
the developing nations of Asia, Latin America, and Africa, with some
exceptions.l Given that several Asian countries have seen considerable'
changes in their IR systems in the 1990s, the goal of this article is to attempt
to understand the nature of the changes and to evaluate whether or not they
amount to fundamental transformations. The similarity in the timing of
change in Asian IR systems with that of the West (both occurred in late
1980s and early 1990s) raises the possibility that there are universal driving
forces, although idiosyncratic national forces presumably also are at work.
If in fact the forces driving change in the West (primarily increased
competitive pressures) operate globally, then one would expect Asian IR
systems to be most likely to evidence changes (relative to African or Latin
American IR systems), given that Asian nations generally are more exposed
to the global economy (World Bank 1998).2
To facilitate this investigation, we first propose an argument regarding IR
system change. We then examine the extent to which Asian IR systems are
changing and whether the directions of change are similar to those we have
seen in the advanced industrial countries outside the region. Thereafter, we
characterize the key features of IR change, including whether or not the
changes constitute fundamental transformations, based on recent work
regarding how to judge whether a transformation has indeed taken place
(Erickson and Kuruvilla 1998a).
Given that an exhaustive review of all Asian IR systems is beyond the
scope of one article, we focus on representative systems. Kuruvilla and
Venkitaratnam (1996) argue that IR systems in Asia are typified by six
distinct stylized models: the Japanese flexible-workplace model, the
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IWhile there are many works that examine changes in IR systems in industries and firms in developing
countries, relatively few have studied IR systems change across countries. See Frenkel and Peetz (1998),
Kuruvilla (1996), and Cook (1996) for some examples.
2Asia's overall trade with the advanced industrial world is higher than that of Latin America or
Africa, and Asia has taken the lion's share of the foreign direct investment to date from the advanced
industrial nations. Moreover, on contemporary measures of openness (e.g., average tariffs, exports/
imports as a percentage of gross domestic product, and FDI as a percentage of gross fixed capital
formation), Asian economies, on average, score significantly higher than their counterparts in the other
developing regions. These data are available in the World Investment Report and several other publi-
cations from UNCT AD.
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tripartite Singapore model, the state-employer-dominated model (Malaysia
and Indonesia), the pluralist decentralized and fragmented IR model (the
Philippines), the politicized multiunion model (India and the rest of South
Asia), and the transitory model (a catch-all category that includes South
Korea, Taiwan, China, and Vietnam). Note that the transitory model takes
into account transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy (South Korea
and Taiwan) as well as from closed to more open economies (China and
Vietnam) during the last decades.
Therefore, we examine IR systems change in seven countries that
conform closely to each of these models: Japan, South Korea, Singapore,
Malaysia, the Philippines, India, and China. Not only are these countries
representative of the Asian region in general terms (they constitute the
majority of Asian gross domestic product and population), but they also
represent the range of IR systems and they provide a good representation of
the different levels of economic development within Asia (with Japan being
an advanced industrialized country; South Korea and Singapore being
newly industrialized countries, also known as "Tigers"; Malaysia and the
Philippines being newly emerging industrial nations; and India and China
having opened their doors to the world economy only recently).
Our focus is primarily on the unionized sector in each country. In most
cases, this sector is a relatively small percentage of the total workforce
(union densities in the countries in our sample vary from 6 to 19 percent,
with China the exception at 70 percent). However, if one calculates density
as a percentage of the industrialized workforce or wage and salary earners
(the OECD uses this basis to calculate union density), these figures are much
higher. For instance, although overall Indian union density is somewhere
between 2.6 and 6 percent, it is about 38 percent when calculated as a
percentage of wage and salary earners and almost 74 percent when
calculated as a percentage of formal sector workers (Das 2000). Thus,
despite small densities by some measures, the unionized sectors are
significant (and often leading edge) parts of the economy.
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Forces Driving IR Change
Most institutio,nal frameworks used for studying IR systems identify
forces that drive IR change-for example, both Dunlop (1958) and Kochan,
Katz, and McKersie (1986) highlight the importance of the economic,
technical, social, political, and legal environments. Although many different
forces can cause change in IR systems, we argue that at any given moment,
some forces will be more urgent than others. While the movement from
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external influences through process to outcomes may be complicated and
difficult for the actors within the system to perceive, the actors nevertheless
will attempt to attend to the more salient of the external constraints (if the
system is at all functional). This is not to suggest that an IR system should be
treated as a single rational actor but rather that particularly urgent external
influences will spur action by various different actors (based on their
perception of the external influences). For example, it is possible that only
one group of actors might respond "strategically" to an external influence, .
leaving the other actors to react to these actions. Alternatively, it is possible
that intended actions often have unintended consequences but that the actors
will continue to attempt to address a salient constraint in some manner until
it is accommodated adequately (even if through a system "chancing" on a
workable set of institutions) or otherwise becomes less salient.
A crucial aspect of the argument is that the most salient constraints facing
IR systems throughout the world have shifted over time. However, it is also
necessary to note that historically, IR systems have not changed all that
much; i.e., there is a tendency for them to get set and remain unchanged for
long periods, except for minor modifications (Katz, Kuruvilla, and Turner
1994; Erickson and Kuruvilla 1998a). Yet the last decade has been a period
of upheaval in IR systems in the West as well as in Asia, suggesting the
possibility that urgent pressure for change has come from the same source.
We argue here that there has been change recently in both the most salient
constraints and in the overall systems.
Most IR systems in the West and in Asia were institutionalized formally
in the decades following World War II [see Kochan, Katz, and McKersie
(1986) for the U.S. case and Erickson and Kuruvilla (1995) for several
other countries). In these first decades after the war, most governments
and large companies gave priority to maintaining labor peace. For
example, note that in the United States the Wagner Act was promulgated
to provide a constructive structure for unions to organize in the wake of
the sit-down strikes and other incidents of labor unrest during the
depression, whereas the Taft-Hartley Act was designed as a counter to the
powerful unions and the wave of strikes after World War II. In addition,
this phenomenon was not limited to the United States. In Japan's case, for
example, there seems to be support for the argument that the basis for the
postwar Japanese IR system was the need for the development of strong
internal labor markets in Japan in the 1950s, given the problems of strikes
and high labor turnover rates (Takahashi 1997; Nakamura and Nitta
1993). In another example, DeSousa (1999) suggests that Indian labor
laws were formulated with the explicit purpose of containing industrial
conflict: to make it difficult for the parties to go on strike by mandating
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some form of third-party dispute resolution and by attempting to foster
"responsible" trade unionism rather than militant trade unionism in both
colonial and postcolonial regimes.
There is evidence that the introduction of formal IR rules and regulations in
many other Asian nations focused initially on the control of conflict [see Hiers
and Arudsothy (1999) for Malaysia, Chew and Chew (1995) for Singapore,
and Ofreneo (1994) for the Philippines]. As we will discuss below, industrial
peace or stability was seen as a prerequisite for economic development in
many of the countries (be it a colonial view of economic development or a
nationalist conception of the same). The imperative to control conflict and
provide industrial stability in the postcolonial state was critical, given the
adoption of industrialization as the engine for economic growth (Kuruvilla
and Mundell 1999). In effect, what we are highlighting is the tendency ofIR
rules and regulations to focus heavily on addressing or reducing conflict at the
time of their inception, although we also note that more highly developed
nations such as Japan and the United States also emphasized industrial peace
in the immediate postwar era. However, we also want to stress that there have
been many differences in the ways the various Asian nations sought to attain
this goal of industrial peace; i.e., they used differing institutional mechanisms.
And it is also true that the goal of maintaining labor peace was influenced
strongly by political considerations in some countries. For instance, several
authors (e.g., Deyo 1989) have suggested that labor suppression in East Asia
was motivated not solely by the need for economic development but as a
means of political control to ensure the stability of the ruling regime.3
We argue that in Asia as in the West, as product markets became more
open to foreign trade, communism weakened, and radical :unions and parties
declined (for various reasons); labor peace became less of a priority. At the
same time, increased product market competition from overseas made cost
reduction on the shop floor increasingly important.. Such cost reductions
often involved increased use of layoffs, temporary workers, and subcon-
tractors. In some nations, cost reductions involved increased skills and labor
reallocation within the firm. In other words, the most salient constraint has
shifted over time from preservation of industrial peace and stability to the
need to maintain and enhance firm-level competitiveness, and this need is
. driving IR systems throughout the world to focus on creating workplaces
that are more flexible in both numerical and functional terms.
3Deyo (1989) suggests, for example, that in South Korea labor suppression predated rapid indus-
trialization. This argument implies that for the South Korean government (the most powerful actor in
South Korean industrial relations), the logic behind the imperative to maintain labor peace primarily
was political in nature.
176 / SAROSH KURUVILLA AND CHRISTOPHER L. ERICKSON
This did not happen overnight. In the West, the relative importance of
maintaining economic competitiveness at the firm level (reducing labor
costs and increasing productivity) as the most salient constraint gradually
grew over the last three decades. The oil shocks, accompanying
developments in consumer markets, and the increasing integration of
all manner of markets led to the disappearance of rents and thus an
increased emphasis on firm-level competitiveness. Some systems adapted
smoothly to these changes-for example, the oil shock environment of
the 1970s drove several European nations to introduce or strengthen.
codetermination as a means to improve the ability of firms to react
flexibly to changes in the economic environment. For others, however, it
took the pressures of the 1980s and 1990s, the increasing internation-
alization and integration of product and factor markets, and the
predictions and perceptions generated by these developments to force
the actors to begin seriously addressing the newly salient constraint of
reducing unit labor costs and enhancing productivity. The upheavals in
Western IR systems in the last decade are an indication of IR regulations
and practices being changed in concrete ways to address this newly
salient constraint, and in some countries, these changes amounted to
fundamental transformation of the systems (Erickson and Kuruvilla
1998a).
We argue that Asian IR systems in the 1990s faced, to some extent, the
same pressures. Many Asian nations have experienced continuous and
unparalleled economic growth during the last 30 years (the newly
industrialized countries) fueled by low-cost export-oriented industrializa-
tion strategies. But in the 1990s, given greater internationalization of
product and factor markets, some of them are faced with the need to
upgrade to higher value-added exports, implying a greater need for
functional flexibility, as in Korea and Malaysia. In other cases, Asian
nations have responded to the pressures of competition by articulating
industrialization strategies that have opened their economies to a greater
extent to both foreign direct investment and international trade and are
confronted.with the need for more functional and numerical flexibility in IR
as a part of this transition. For example, in China and India, nations that
have liberalized their economies only recently, the pressures to compete in
the international marketplace are driving changes in IR to emphasize firm-
level competitiveness. In Korea, democratization and the power of labor
unions have forced Korean employers to seek new ways to maintain
competitiveness, and this has forced them to change IR strategies. Thus the
primary manifestation of the tightening of the firm-level competitiveness
constraint can be seen in the search for more functionality and numerical
,
.
9
.
.
.
,
.
.
,
.
.
t
.,
~
.
..
.
.
4)
()
,'}
t~
1 Change and Transformation in Asian Industrial Relations / 177
, flexibility in IR. This is not to say that flexibility was not a concern earlier
but more to say that it has become the central concern of IR actors in the
1990s in Asia.<;
,
0
The Concepts of Stability and Flexibility
It is important to clarify a central part of our argument: use of the terms
stability and flexibility and their interrelationship. Stability is used here in its
broadest sense, and stability-enhancing actions are interpreted to include the
processes of eliminating the causes of industrial conflict, steering conflict
away from the modality of strikes to the modality of compulsory third-party
dispute resolution, centralized control of wage increases, and in some cases,
asserting control over unions and strikes for political purposes. Each nation
had a somewhat different conception of stability (as the case discussions
below will show). For some actors (e.g., the government in India), stability
at the time of institutionalization of the IR system focused on the control of
conflict. Consequently, regulations were introduced to ensure that strikes
should be withdrawn if either party requested conciliation services from the
government. Similarly, the ability of employers to layoff employees was
restricted by legislation to eliminate one potential source of conflict. For the
government of Singapore, stability was seen as necessary for foreign
investment and implied the control of strikes through mechanisms similar to
those found in India; but it also implied control over wage bargaining (for
. nominal wage stability) through the institutional apparatus of the tripartite
National Wages Council. Wage stability was seen as key in the early years of
economic development. To reduce conflict, transfers, promotions, job
assignments, and layoffs were declared "not bargainable subjects" in
Singapore. In Singapore and Malaysia, giving the industrial arbitration
court the authority to modify collective-bargaining agreements on the
grounds that it did not meet the national interest was another method of
ensuring some degree of stability (Kuruvilla 1996). In Malaysia, IR stability
was linked with political stability, and union federations were not permitted
to ~ngage in political action. In more authoritarian regimes such as South
Korea, union activity was curtailed severely and the imperative was
primarily political rather than economic. Our point is that stability, broadly
defined, was a central concern of the dominant actors during the inception
of most IR systems in Asia.
Although stability was the most pressing constraint addressed at that
time by the actors, we do not argue that these systems were not flexible. In
fact, in some of the countries, the institutions that were designed to create
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stability also provided a high degree of functional flexibility in particular.
For example, the Singapore case suggests that while the restrictions on
bargaining subjects (e.g., transfers, promotions, layoffs, and job assign-
ments) were designed to reduce industrial disputes, they also provided
employers with a considerable degree of flexibility in allocating workers. An
even more powerful example is that of Japan, where the institutions that
provided labor peace in the postwar era also allowed for a great deal of
functional flexibility. However, in Singapore and Japan, facilitation of
flexibility was not the central imperative driving the development of their'
IR systems at midcentury; rather, the initial achievement of labor stability
provided an environment in which employers were later able to seek
functional flexibility. Our argument is that the shift in constraints has
created a situation where the imperative to increase various kinds of
flexibility has become a central rather than a secondary concern. We now
turn to a more in-depth discussion of the concept of flexibility.
Flexibility is also a multidimensional concept. As Grenier, Giles, and
Belanger (1997) suggest, it is important to distinguish the institutionaUevel
at which flexibility is examined and the different types of flexibility. Thus
flexibility can be examined at the level of the labor market or at the level of
the firm or establishment. Flexibility at the level of the labor market refers
to those economy- or industry-wide institutions that have undergone change
to make the labor market function more effectively. Decentralization in
wage bargaining from the industry level to the firm level would be one
example of a movement toward this form of flexibility.
In this article we highlight flexibility at the level of the firm or
establishment, which focuses heavily on the manner in which internal labor
markets are configured to meet organizational needs (Grenier, Giles, and
Belanger 1997). There are two primary strategies for achieving this form of
flexibility: functional and numerical. They refer to "how" and "how much"
labor is used. Functional flexibility strategies refer to those actions which
modify existing internal labor markets, e.g., changes in work organization
and the work process, investments in training and skills development, tying
pay to performance, introducing other forms of flexible pay, and enhancing
worker involvement in production decisions, and can include multiskilling,
job rotation, work teams, and increases in labor-management collaboration.
Numerical flexibility strategies typically involve increased use of casual and
temporary labor, subcontracting, layoffs, retrenchments, and other actions
that reduce employment security and the number of workers and externalize
parts of the production system. Thus a decision to reduce employment and
increase subcontracting is an IR system outcome, in our view. Other terms
for the two types of flexibility include static (external) and dynamic
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,
, (internal) flexibility.4 In this article we will use the terms numerical and
functional flexibility.
Because numerical and functional flexibility have different goals (one cuts
labor, whereas the other tries to redeploy and motivate labor to be more
productive), many have argued that they are incompatible. Yet Streeck (1988)
suggests that some numerical flexibility operations such as the creative use of
overtime and work sharing can coexist with functional flexibility. Grenier,
Giles, and Belanger (1997) suggest that functional and numerical flexibility
can coexist in a firm if the workforce is divided into a core group that is the
target of functional flexibility strategies and a peripheral group that is the
target of numerical flexibility strategies. It is even possible for firms that are
already highly flexible internally to begin to focus on external flexibility, as we
shall argue is the case in Japan. In general, however, numerical flexibility
strategies appear to be followed by the search for functional flexibility,S
flexibility strategies predominate. Yet there are exceptions, as we note below.
Having defined numerical and functional flexibility, we will use these
definitions in our characterizations of how IR systems are changing in the
countries in this study. In sum, our hypothesis is that IR actors in the 1980s
and 1990s have taken a number of actions to pursue numerical and/or
functional flexibility in employment, IR, and human resources (HR)
practices and policies as they try to adjust from older sets of salient
constraints (the need for labor peace and stability) to the newer constraints
(the need for the IR system to promote increasing firm-level competitive-
ness). Thus, to the extent that there is an underlying cause for the changes
reported in the last decade in Asian IR, it is to be found in the general
explanation of the shift in the salient constraints. We will attempt to
characterize the types of flexibility strategies that predominated during the
period of change in a given system.
Note further that we are not arguing that IR systems hinder or enhance
the different types of flexibility (they can do either, depending on the nature
of the specific practices). Instead, the argument is that the actors (and thus
the systems) are now emphasizing numerical and/or functional flexibility as
goals and are trying out various methods by which to gain this flexibility.
One method toward achieving this is to change some of the institutions,
v
,
0
~
.
.
~
t
.
.
.
~
.
.
.
.
.
4See Grenier, Giles, and Belanger (1997), Streeck (1988), Piore and Sabel (1984), and Deyo (1997) for
further discussion on different types of flexibility. Some authors suggest that wage flexibility should be a
separate flexibility category, but we see the use of pay as a key component of internal labor markets.
sIn part, in Asia, we view numerical flexibility strategies as a precursor to functional flexibility
strategies due to the nature of the development of competitive advantage. In general, where competitive
advantage is based on low costs, numerical flexibility strategies tend to predominate. Where competit-
iveness is based on high productivity and skills, functional flexibility strategies predominate.
,
.
.
,.
180 / SAROSH KURUVILLA AND CHRISTOPHER L. ERICKSON
rules, and practices. These are the major themes we shall investigate in the
case studies that follow.
As we write this article, it is important to note that there have been 2
years of severe economic crisis in East and Southeast Asia. In this article we
will take into account the short-term reactions of Asian IR systems to this
crisis. Our results here are consistent with the view that the short-term
reactions are fundamentally in conjunction with longer-term movements
(i.e., pre crisis) toward increased numerical and functional flexibility in IR
and workplace arrangements throughout Asia (Erickson and Kuruvilla ,
1998b). If anything, the economic crisis has only accelerated movements
toward increased numerical and/or functional flexibility and provided a
facilitative way out of impasse regarding negotiations over increased
numerical flexibility in particular. At the same time, however, the crisis also
has spurred new movements toward tripartism and collaborative structures
in some of the countries.
In the country cases below, we seek to identify the underlying logic of the
IR system when the system was institutionalized, followed by a brief
overview of its development and the current state of IR/HR policy and
practice. Space limitations permit only a brief description of each case-we
do not purport our cases to be comprehensive in their coverage of IR in
each country. Rather, we are looking to see if in general, the movements in
IR in each country are consistent with our argument. In the section
following the case studies we attempt to characterize more broadly the
nature of the recent changes in Asian IR systems.
Country Cases
Japan. There is general agreement that the central features of the
Japanese IR system have included workplace-focused enterprise unions,
lifetime employment systems, broad-based training, and seniority-based
wages. There is also agreement that one of the key outcomes of the Japanese
IR system, when examined in conjunction with related Japanese institutions
such as the keiretsu system and the system of production organization
(subcontracting and quality-focused, team-based work), is the simultaneous
achievement of stability in labor market terms and considerable functional
flexibility in workplace-level IR through the development of internal labor
markets. Our goal here is to briefly review arguments regarding. the
historical development of the Japanese IR system in the twentieth century
t
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. and then to discuss recent changes and the substantial disagreement over
the extent to which the system is fundamentally transforming.
i
.
IR policy and practice prior to 1990s. There is disagreement on the date of
institutionalization of the Japanese IR system. Taira (1970) suggests that
the lifetime employment practice developed in the late l800s in the silk
industry, where employers, forced to compete for scarce labor, instituted
lifetime employment to create stable employment conditions. The key
practices were encouraged by the government, which institutionalized
several of them during the interwar period in its Factories Act of 1938.
Enterprise unionism emerged after the war based on the structure of the
firms (the large employers who accounted for a significant share of
employment). Jacoby (1993) and Gordon (1985) also suggest that precur-
sors to the current system could be seen in the company unions of the 1920s,
with institutionalization occurring during the interwar period. Cusumano
(1985) argues that it was the early labor-management crises in the postwar
period, coupled with the revolution in production management (i.e., the
engineering developments under Ohno Taichi), that account for the creation
of the more advanced aspects of the internal labor market in Japanese
industry, whereas Okayama (1986) also credits the industrial strife of the
1950s as the most important variable in the development of the Japanese IR
system, a view also held by Kenney and Florida (1994) and Takahashi
(1997), who argues that "the main stimulus [for lifetime employment] was
the experience of large-scale conflict between labor and capital in the early
postwar years, partly in response to many workers being made redundant as
the war industries shut down. Employers sought a way to end or reduce this
conflict. . . . [It was] not a social or political norm impervious to pressures of
economic change."
Clearly, these authors suggest that the most salient constraint in Japan
during this period was the need for labor peace. However, the institutional
structures that provided stable internal labor markets also provided
Japanese employers with a high degree of functional flexibility in the use
of human resources as lifetime employment, firm-specific training, and
enterprise-based unionism became widespread. And the interconnections
among corporations given the keiretsu structure [cross-corporate holdings
and agreements or, as Gerlach (1992) and Berggerren (1993) have termed it,
"alliance capitalism"] further enhanced flexibility because workers could be
transferred from one company to another when needed within the keiretsu.
These connections also made it more possible for firms to sustain their
promise of lifetime employment (Berggeren 1993). The development of
internal labor markets had an impact on the wider labor market and
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education systems as well, as Nakamura and Nitta (1993) suggest.
Nakamura and Nitta note that the development of internal labor markets
and lifetime employment systems created a highly segmented labor force
with little intersegment mobility. Thus those with lifetime employment
invariably were those who graduated from the best schools, and those at
lesser schools were forced to enter a different segment of the labor market,
from which upward mobility was not possible. This system also made
education very competitive as families strove to ensure that their children'
did well enough to get into the best schools and thus into lifetime jobs.
These linkages reinforced the core of the Japanese system well into the early
1980s. Thus the picture that emerges (Table 1) is one characterized by highly
functionally flexible IR systems within firms, in a context of a fair degree of
rigidity in the labor market more generally. Dore's (1986) term "flexible
rigidity" sums up this phenomenon.
It is also true that there were several changes in the Japanese system
during the 1970s and 1980s. Notably, there was an erosion of the seniority-
based wage concept as increasingly wages began to be tied to skills
acquisition and productivity, and employers started the practice of
midcareer hires in white-collar and technical occupations. The practice of
shukko-transferring employees to other parts of the keiretsu during
downturns-had gained in prominence over the last two decades. However,
as we shall see in the next section, the changes in the 1990s were even more
far-reaching.
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Recent changes. Our argument is that in the 1990s there has been an
acceleration of changes already underway, as well as changes in other
practices that constitute the core of the Japanese system. This has been due
.
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TABLE 1
JAPANESE IR PRE-1990
,
Union density and
union voice Union structure Bargaining structure
Largely
enterprise-based,
with some informal
coordination on wage
bargaining through
the spring Shunto
Dominant IR and
HR issues
Density declined
steadily from approx.
25% in 1970s to 18.6%
in 1995.
Unions have had
strong voice at
workplace level
as well as national
level through labor
federations (Rengo).
Largely
enterprise-based,
but each union is
affiliated with major
national labor
federations.
Highly developed internal
labor markets at big
firms (with lifetime
employment and firm-
specific training) that
resulted in stability and
functional flexibility, but
some rigidity in external
labor market terms.
.
t
.
It
.
Change and Transfonnation in Asian Industrial Relations / 183
.
in large part to the effect of the recession of the 1990s, as Berggeren (1993)
argues, which has been the deepest one since the war. Thus, in the 1990s,
there has been a significant questioning of the lifetime employment concept,
with severe declines in job security on an unprecedented scale, changes in
hiring practices from schools and universities, a dramatic increase in
outsourcing strategies, the introduction of limited-term employment
contracts for some occupations, increased wage flexibility, and some degree
of union restructuring, along with evidence of the breakup of some
keiretsus. By themselves, anyone of these changes might suggest a gradual
adaptation to new economic circumstances (and indeed, as noted earlier,
some of this happened in the 1970s and 1980s), but all of this happening
together in the 1990s suggests the critical importance of the recession of the
1990s in forcing employers to question their existing practices and act to
change them. We discuss evidence of these facets of change below.
One facet of change is the decline in job security and lifetime employment,
as well as changes in hiring practices. Berggerren (1993) reported the
massive declines in capacity utilization, particularly in the automobile and
electronics sectors, as Japanese manufacturers located more and more
production in Southeast Asia in response to cost pressures. Shimokawa
(1998) and Toyonaga (1998) report similar excess capacity problems in the
automobile and electrical industries. In the electrical industry, Toyonaga
(1998) argues that increased outsourcing of production from Japan
(overseas production in this industry increased from 11 percent in 1990 to
16.8 percent in 1996) to other Asian countries has resulted in a net decrease
in employment (male employment increased from 1.3 million to 1.4 million,
whereas female employment decreased from 1.16 million to 900,000).
In these industries, both layoffs and plant closures have occurred (e.g.,
Nissan's Zama plant, Hitachi's recent layoff of 3000 workers), apart from
large job losses for casual/temporary workers and women (traditional buffer
groups that sustain the lifetime employment system). In general, there has
been an increase in layoffs as a function of downsizing (Yamakawa 1999),
and the average tenure in large firms decreased in the 1990-1994 period
(Lincoln and Nakata 1997). In 1995, 4.2 jobs were lost per 100 workers,
compared with 2.1 jobs per 100 workers in 1991.
The 1990s have witnessed a sudden and dramatic increase in outsourcing
within Japan as well, termed work commissioning. A Ministry of Labor
survey (Japan Labor Bulletin 1998) finds that 45 percent of 4500 firms
surveyed had increased outsourcing due to the need for increased numerical
flexibility. The survey shows two mechanisms of outsourcing. Either the
work itself is subcontracted outside the company, or the job is kept within
the firm's premises but is done by "dispatched workers" (workers employed
,
.
.
t
.
.
t
t
.
t
)
.
.
.
.
.
.
184 / SAROSH KURUVILLA AND CHRISTOPHER L. ERICKSON
by a subcontractor providing labor services). In the latter case, regular
female employees have been the first to lose their jobs to dispatched
workers. The number of dispatched workers has increased from 140,000 in
1985 to 890,000 in 1998 (JLB 2000), whereas part-time workers have
increased from 4.7 million to 11.1 million over the same period (JLB 2000).
Apart from the clear evidence of job loss, suggestive of a declining
commitment to lifetime employment (Lincoln and Nakata 1997) there are
chinks in the hiring system, which is an integral part of lifetime
employment. First, there has been a reduction in hiring, and second, there>
have been changes in the hiring practices of large firms. A recent Ministry of
Labor survey (1998) reports that the percentage of graduates hired by large
companies fell 17 percent amQng men and 41 percent among women. The
ratio of job openings to job applicants fell to 0.47 (the lowest since 1963).
The placement rate for 4-year university graduates was 65.6 percent, the
lowest figure since 1951 (at its peak, this rate was 81.3 in 1991). Only 62
percent of high school graduates obtained jobs in 1996, the lowest rate since
1978. Cutbacks in hiring only suggest the extent of the change but do not
provide an indication of nature of the changes in the system. Changes
in hiring practices by trend-setting firms provide better clues as to whether
hiring practices are being transformed.
Siegel (1999) reports that the number of midcareer hires have increased
substantially over the last decade and that many companies (e.g., Sony)
have started 5-year employment contracts for some occupations, such as
software engineers, a clear departure from the system of hiring that was the
basis behind lifetime employment. Berggerren (1993) and Lincoln and
Nakata (1997) document that several other companies stopped the practice
of recruiting graduates from the elite universities in favor of second-tier
schools. Moreover, last fall Nissan hired contingent workers for the first
time. Two reasons are driving such changes in hiring, suggest Lincoln and
Nakata (1997): the cost savings induced by hiring less elite graduates and
the fact that fast-changing technologies are undermining the traditional
system of taking novices and providing firm-specific skills. For example, the
increases in employment in the service sector motivate people to move from
manufacturing to services, notably in the finance profession. Thus larger
chinks are appearing in the lifetime employment and recruitment system. In
what has been seen as an effort to "legitimize" contractual employment, the
Japanese Diet passed a new law providing legal backing for limited-
duration employment contracts in March of 1998, thus providing a legal
basis for the breakup of the lifetime employment norm.
These changes in the employment relationship are set against a wider
picture of change in IR and HR in Japan. For instance, there are changes in
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organizational structure toward flatter organizations, eliminating the dual
hierarchy system that has existed for decades. Yamakawa (1999) points out
changes in corporate governance (reducing the size of the board of
directors) allows for quicker decision making: "The competitive and global
market has driven Japanese companies to change their management style to
make speedy decisions and cut operations costs, including that of human
resources" (p. 11). Lincoln and Nakata (1997) document several cases where
the determinants of pay have shifted from seniority to performance. While
wage increases have been getting smaller, there is ample evidence that the
variation in wage increases and bonus payments is increasing, and recently,
the National Personnel Authority has recommended pay cuts for govern-
ment servants to keep in step with the declines in compensation for the
private sector (Japan Labor Bulletin 1998). Benson's (1998) longitudinal
surveys also suggest an increase in wage flexibility generally.
These changes have reduced the power of trade unions. As Morishima
(1999) notes, "Unions in Japan are currently facing a difficult time with
increased membership losses and decreasing membership loyalty" (p.ll),
and Rengo (the predominant peak-level federation) is making efforts to
strengthen the industry federations to make up for the weaknesses of
enterprise unions by pushing for unification of industrial federations. This is
evidenced by the recent merger of Zenkin Rengo (the Japanese Federation
of Metal Industry Unions) with Kinzoku Kikai (the Metal Machinery
Workers Union of Japan), as well as the establishment of a new union
federation in the commercial sector by July 2000 and further, the
encouragement of industrial federations in land transportation (a sector
that has seen at least 8250 jobs lost in 1999) to merge in 2003.
These changes, we argue, are a consequence of the need for increased
numerical flexibility. Observers often have painted the Japanese IR and HR
system as being highly functionally flexible, particularly in terms of the
ability of Japanese employers to adapt to market conditions. Key elements
in this flexibility have been the patterns of subcontracting, the use of
temporary labor that enabled the lifetime employment system, highly
sophisticated internal labor markets, and the keiretsu system. However, the
experience of the 1990s indicates that now different types of flexibility are
being sought. As Lincoln and Nakata (1997) note, there is a movement
toward a higher level of market-oriented flexibility than the three pillars
system has thus far allowed-thus removing the rigid from Dore's term of
"flexible rigidities" and hence the focus on numerical flexibility.
We view these changes as a movement toward IR system transformation,
given that the evidence suggests changes in most aspects of employment
relations in Japan, such as job security, hiring, corporate governance, wages
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and wage flexibility, and the role of seniority (Morishima 1998), as well as
union structure, and seemingly would consist of a significant eroding of the
three pillars and a move toward a more individual-based system such as in
the United States (Brown et al. 1997). There is also some evidence that the
keiretsu system is breaking down after the crisis, possibly as a result of firms'
capital requirements, and thus one major source of the "stickiness" seems to
be weakening. Other observers (e.g., Lincoln and Nakata 1997; Berggeren
1993), however, suggest that there is considerable stickiness still remaining,
in the Japanese system, and they are hard pressed to decide whether these
changes are fundamental. Our view is more similar to that of Benson (1998),
who argues that these changes represent an evolutionary process toward
more fundamental change that reflects the need for the rigidities in the
employment system to be broken down. Although the Japanese IR system
witnessed some change in the 1970s and 1980s, the 1990s has seen a major
acceleration of change in several different facets of the system, which, taken
together, may well represent the beginnings of a radical change in Japanese
IR.
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South Korea. IR policy and practice prior to 1987. Although there were
several changes in Korean IR regulation after the war, the 1953 legislation
regarding trade unions and labor disputes formally established IR in Korea.
The rights granted to trade unions, however, were revoked during the 1960s
and thereafter. During the 1945-1960 period, workplace IR in the major
conglomerates known as chaebols (Samsung, Lucky Goldstar, Hyundai,
and Daewoo were the largest) was modeled closely on the Japanese system
and has been described by various authors as "paternalistic" or "autho-
ritarian" (Lee 1993). Given the chaebos' almost hegemonic hold on
industrial activity (their sales amounted to almost 68 percent of gross
national product in 1988) and the predominance of small firms (87 percent
of establishments have less than 49 employees, accounting for 29 percent of
the workforce), clearly the chaebols are the best places to view IR in action
(Ungson, Steers, and Park 1997).
Leggett (1997), in reviewing the development of South Korean IR during
the 1945-1960 period, sums up its primary characteristics: "the subordi-
nation of workers and trade unions to the combined, institutionalized
interests of a repressive state and monopolistic capitalism" (p. 67).6 The
methods different regimes used subordinated labor varied by regime.
However, as Kim (1990, 1995) and Park and Lee (1993) argue, these
.
)
)
,
}
..
.
~
6Some authors disagree and argue that Leggett's characterization is more descriptive of the 1961-
1981 (Park-chung Hee) and 1981-1987 (Chun-doo Hwan) periods rather than the 1945-1960s period.
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methods clearly were introduced to deal with industrial conflict that might
threaten the prosperity of the chaebols and thus economic development
generally. Apart from direct repression through the use of force, the state
also mandated labor-management councils in every enterprise, introduced
tripartite commissions at provincial (district) levels to resolve disputes (these
commissions grew out of the 1953 legislation), and promulgated laws that
restricted direct action by labor through mandated cooling-off periods
before 1980.7
The ascendancy of a new martial law leader (General Chun-doo Hwan) in
1981 coincided with a change in economic development strategy toward
higher-value-added exports (Wilkinson, 1994), and consequently, there were
more changes in IR legislation. In early 1981, legal changes mandated the
formation of Japanese-style enterprise unions, although the government
ensured its system of political control by forcing all enterprise unions to be
part of the FKTU (the government-mandated union confederation).
Further, given the involvement of both students and church organizations,
the government prohibited the involvement of "third parties" in unions.
While these actions clearly were politically motivated, they also helped the
chaebols contain or avoid industrial conflict and continue their "authori-
tarian" management styles. Although there were efforts to introduce some
labor protection laws and regulate vocational and skills training, the
primary focus was political control of IR activity, i.e., stability. Thus the
Korean IR system during the period of martial law continued to have
dispute prevention and dispute avoidance as the primary focus of its policies
as part of the overall goal of maintaining stability in IR for economic
development (e.g., in particular, the government's efforts to control wage
costs) and political control.
Incidentally, the various restrictions on union activities also provided
employers with substantial control over the workplace to pursue the
Japanese-style internal labor market arrangements at the workplace level
that are characteristic of large Korean chaebols (Kim 1995). The chaebol
workplace HR practices were similar to those of Japan, directed as Leggett
(1997) argues at achieving a "unified internal labor market," which included
implicit employment guarantees, seniority-based wages, and formalized
,
,
t
.
,
.
.
.
)
)
,
)
.
)
7There are two differing views regarding the underlying rationale of IR regulations during the Park
period. Deyo (1989) argues that the primary purpose of repressive labor relations during the 1960s was
to maintain political stability. Lee (1993) argues that the focus of IR legislation and institutions was
altered to be consistent with Korea's export-oriented industrialization strategy and to maintain stability.,
cost containment, and conflict reduction. Both views have substance and are not mutually exclusive.
A regime of repression focused on political stability also can be modified effectively to control costs and
enhance an economic development strategy based on low costs within an authoritarian framework.
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recruitment from good schools, as well as cultural and ideological programs
as part of a strategy to weaken independent trade unions and to promote
company-loyal unionism, a point also made by Woo (1997). Not all authors
. in Korea are convinced that the chaebols were able to pursue an internal
labor market-based system to the same extent as the Japanese. Rather,
paternalism thrived under an authoritarian framework. Whatever the
interpretation, however, power clearly was in favor of the employer during
these periods (Woo 1997). Key features of the Korean system before 1987 '
are depicted in Table 2. -
,
.
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Recent changes. With democratization in 1987, IR legislation and
practice have changed substantially, with the Korean IR system entering
what Leggett (1997) calls a "transitional period." With liberalization of
labor law, the trade union movement mushroomed, with a sharp increase in
union density (18.6 percent in 1990) and strikes during the 1987-1989 period
(Frenkel and Peetz 1998). The hegemony of the FKTU finally was broken
as new, independent unions formed and some of them created the KCTU in
opposition to the FKTU (Woo 1997). The scope of bargaining expanded
substantially, and trade unions, confronted with a management unused to
collective bargaining, have been able to use their economic power to win
substantial nominal wage increases (71 percent during 1988-1990) (Park
and Lee 1993; Shin and Wailes 1997:3). Bargaining power thus appeared to
be with the unions in the years immediately following democratization.
Given the erosion of their competitive position, Korean chaebols have
reacted to the militant union demands by following a mixture of suppressive
policies (Frenkel and Peetz 1998) and progressive HR practices, although
these practices were introduced by only some of the chaebols (e.g., LG
promoting labor-management collaboration.). In the early 1990s, employers
were pointing out the need to cut labor, given the increases in costs. The
..
,
.~
)
)
)
~
TABLE 2
SOUTH KOREAN IR PRE-1987 )
Union density and
umon vOIce Union structure Bargaining structure
Dominant IR and
HR issues }
Union density was
about 9% before 1987,
and union voice at
national and workplace
levels was low.
Unions were
enterprise-based,
with compulsory
affiliation to the
single government-
recognized labor
federation (FKTU).
Largely
enterprise-based,
but limited form of
bargaining under
martial law
Similar to Japan highly
developed internal labor
markets at large chaebol;
a general focus on
stability and internal
flexibility. >
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state initially tried to inject some wage moderation through the articulation
of wage norms (the norm was 10 percent in 1990) with little success as
different chaebols adopted different strategies of dealing with the unions.
The unions also have been divided during this period. However, some
unions, notably those affiliated with the FKTU, advocated moderation
given the needs of Korean competitiveness, but the independent unions that
started forming around 1991 and finally grew into the KCTU in 1995
(which was illegal and continued to be so until 1999) were not in agreement
with the policies of the FKTU.
The erosion in competitive position also saw an increase in Korean
investment abroad in low-cost areas, particularly in Asia and Latin
America. As Korean exports and profits started to decline during the
1994-1995 period, employers began to step up their demands for IR
restructuring to make workplaces more flexible and to get rid of the implicit
lifetime employment contract, or norm, that existed in the large chaebols
(see Kim and Leggett 1998). The diversity of employer strategies increased
as they sought to restructure IR and HR. Although these efforts were met
with some degree of resistance by the unions, there was some progress in the
movement toward functional flexibility and increasing skills as well as
restructuring ([see Pucik and Lim (1996)] for a review of IR and HR
restructuring efforts in one major chaebol).
The government of Kim Young-Sam responded to the growing union
militancy in 1996 with a predawn clandestine reform of labor legislation,
which on the one hand allowed union participation in politics and allowed
multiple unions in the workplace by 2002 and on the other hand avoided
recognition of other peak federations until 2000 and, most important,
increased the authority of employers to layoff employees (Kim 1997:5).
These changes resulted in widespread labor agitation and strikes. In
general, the 9 years following democratization can be characterized as a
period of experimentation and diversification in IR practice and regula-
tion.
The Asian economic crisis beginning in 1997 hastened the process of IR
restructuring. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout of the
SOJlthKorean economy, coupled with the accession of Kim Dae-Jung
(viewed as more friendly to the labor movement than his predecessor) paved
the way for far-reaching changes in IR in 1998. For the first time, labor was
given participation in national decisions through the creation of the
Tripartite Commission, an II-member commission with 2 representatives
from management, the ministers of finance and labor, and representatives
from 4 political parties. The commission issued a social pact for dealing
with the economic crisis, with several key decisions on IR. These
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included, apart from recognizing the KCTU, the establishment of an
unemployment insurance fund ($0.3 billion) coupled with expansion in the
amount and periods of unemployment benefits as part of a social safety net
package, collective-bargaining rights for the public sector from 1999, the
freedom of labor unions to be active politically, a revision of labor laws to
permit layoffs, the ability to use temporary labor for periods of up to 1 year,
advance notification of intended layoffs, and various obligations of
employers in the case of layoffs. In addition, the agreement introduced a .
change in the long-standing practice of employers paying the wages offull-
time union leaders. As Park (1998) argues, it was the need for numerical
flexibility that resulted in these provisions. And Park argues that the labor
movement's willingness to accept layoffs could have happened only at this
juncture, when the pressure of the economic crisis was great, and with the
trust that labor has in President Kim Dae-Jung, although it is not clear that
all workers (within the KCTU) supported the agreement.
The effects of the social pact are still being played out. On the one hand,
the agreement has met several of labor's long-standing demands, such as
recognition of the KCTU as a national federation, collective-bargaining
rights for teachers, and more important, a voice in national decision making
through the peak-level Tripartite Commission. On the other hand, the
economic crisis and the IMF bailout coupled with the law permitting layoffs
have weakened workplace unions considerably. This is illustrated by the
fact that job security was the primary bargaining issue in 1998 in Korea,
whereas it had been taken for granted in the past.
The KCTU, at best a skeptical participant in the Tripartite Commission,
thereafter has shown an unwillingness to cooperate in the Tripartite
Commission and efforts of the various chaebols to restructure and layoff
have been met with a wave of strikes. Although a strike at Ryundai in
response to layoffs in 1998 was settled through government intervention,
local unions continue to resort to the strike in the face of restructuring
efforts by corporations. One consequence since then is several companies
have attempted to guarantee some degree of job security (e.g., Daewoo
Precision, lnchon Steel, and Korea Telecommunications). Companies and
unions are also making attempts to increase labor-management cooper-
ation. For example, the Ranil Lease union used its strike fund of WlOO
million ($82,000 at current exchange rates) to protect the company from
being bankrupted in April 1998. However, it is difficult to determine
whether these examples are part of a sustainable trend.
Since the Korean economy has begun its recovery from the financial crisis
of 1999, our talks with various Korean scholars (Lee 2000) suggest that the
Tripartite Commission has not lived up to its promise of creating a social
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dialogue at the national level. By January 1999, the agreement, among the
government, employers, and unions via the Tripartite Commission has
broken down, primarily over the job security and employment flexibility
issues. The workers of the KCTU struck in a campaign to limit employment
cuts and replace them with work sharing. By April 24, 2000, automobile
workers of Daewoo were on strike protesting the restructuring efforts and
potential closure of Daewoo's automotive business, to which the govern-
ment responded with arrests of striking workers and union leaders. Thus
there is considerable turmoil and the new IR system forged in the midst of
the economic crisis would appear to be another step in experimentation in
South Korean IR in its long-run search for increased flexibility, both
functional and numerical. 8
In summary, then, Korean IR continues to be in a period of transition,.
with a lot of experimentation with institutions and a high degree of diversity
in practice. The transition to democracy in Korea coincided with, and to
some extent hastened, the need for increased flexibility in IR as Korean
competitiveness in several sectors eroded, particularly in the lower-cost
sectors of textiles, shoes, and electronics, where there has been a migration
of Korean firms to the rest of Asia. In other sectors, employers have
attempted to restructure their businesses and IR (Frenkel and Peetz, 1998),
and the financial crisis has hastened the need for such restructuring. The
IMF bailout and the accession of Kim Dae-Jung has facilitated to some
degree employers' push for increased flexibility. Despite a peak-level
agreement that permitted layoffs, however, the efforts of employers to
,
enhance workplace-level functional and numerical flexibility have been met
with resistance by a labor movement that is stronger and more vocal.
Further, as a consequence of the 1997 legislation permitting them, the
number of industrial unions are growing; between 1998 and 2000, seven
industrial unions have formed, and others are in the process of forming
although employers have resisted industrial-level bargaining. Clearly,
however, numerical flexibility has become a key aim for Korean employers,
whereas job security has become a key goal of Korean unions during the
decade of the 1990s.
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Singapore. IR policy and practice. Singapore's IR system is well known
for its distinctive tripartite features and in the view of many observers it is
one of the most stable and functionally flexible IR systems in Asia. On
adoption of its export-oriented industrialization program, based on foreign
8The effects of the search for numerical flexibility can be seen in increased earnings inequalities: The
Gini coefficient rose from 0.283 in 1997 to 0.320 in 1999.
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investment in the 1960s, the focus of IR policy in Singapore was to provide
foreign investors with a "stable, cheap, and flexible IR system" (Chiang
1988:239). While low labor costs were clearly its biggest comparative
advantage in the 1960s, stability was seen as essential in attracting foreign
investment and institutions were devised to create wage stability and
industrial peace.
Stability was promoted through the creation of a tripartite IR structure
with joint decision making on all aspects of economic and social.
development. To create "responsible" unionism, the state provided funding
and training to union leaders on economic development issues. To ensure
that disputes did not result in strikes, the legislation provided for secret
ballots on strikes, a notice period, and withdrawal of strikes once the
dispute was under mediation or conciliation proceedings (see Leggett 1993).
An industrial arbitration court was established to deal with disputes not
settled through mediation and to take cognizance (give legal standing to a
collective contract) of all agreements, with the power to refuse to recognize
agreements against the national interest (Krislov and Leggett 1985). Strikes
were prohibited in industries deemed "essential to the economic develop-
ment process."
To create stability in wage negotiations, the tripartite National Wages
Council recommended standard wage increases throughout the economy
(Chew and Chew 1995). At the workplace level, to prevent industrial
disputes from arising over certain issues, bargaining was not allowed on
transfers, promotions, job assignments, terminations, and hiring. While
these laws certainly reduced disputes, they also created the preconditions for
all types of flexibility because they gave the employer substantial control
over the workplace [see Chiang (1988) and Kuruvilla (1996) for more
detailed descriptions of this part of the system]. Strike data suggest that
some degree of IR stability has been achieved, in that Singapore reports one
of the lowest incidences of strikes in Asia and has seen only one strike in the
last 10 years. While the tripartite system clearly provides labor with a high
degree of voice over national decision making it is important to point out,
as Leggett (1993) does, that it is hard to see the Singapore labor movement
as being truly independent of the ruling People's Action Party (Table 3).
Recent changes. Since the 1960s, there have been changes in IR and HR
regulations at regular intervals (in 1968, 1972, 1982, and 1984) yet these
changes were minor and did not depart from the basic framework. Each
change has introduced a little more functional flexibility in IR. In the early
1980s, for example, the need to upgrade Singapore's low-cost-based export-
oriented industrialization program to higher-value-added export-oriented
.
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, TABLE3
SINGAPORE IR
,
Union density
and union voice Union structure
Mix of industrial
and enterprise
unions, although
all new unions
are enterprises
based.
Bargaining structure
Largely
en terprise- based,
but also to some
degree through
tripartite institutions,
such as the
National Wages
Council.
Dominant IR and
HR issues
Focus of policy and
practice on stability
and wage and functional
flexibility; more recently,
a strong focus on skills
development.
9
.
Union density has
declined gradually from
about 17% in 1984 to
about 13.5% in 1995.
Union voice is high
at the national level
through the tripartite
system but low at the
workplace level.
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) industrialization required more capital-intensive investors, highly skilled
labor, and flexible arrangements between the two. The labor movement was
restructured; the existing "omnibus" unions were broken up into industry-
wide unions, and some enterprise unions were created out of existing
industry unions and the establishment of enterprise unions in the future was
encouraged. This was done to make individual collective-bargaining
agreements more sensitive to the economic environments facing individual
firms. In support, the National Wages Council desisted from its practice of
recommending uniform wage increases and advocated differential increases
based on the conditions of industries and firms. To create a more highly
skilled workforce, the government restructured education and promoted the
skills-development fund (the 1984 legislative change) to encourage firms to
invest continuously in skill formation and development (see Kuruvilla and
Chua 1999). Over the subsequent years, the National Wages Council further
decentralized its wage recommendations, promoting flexible compensation
linked to productivity and the use of lump-sum bonuses [see Chew and
Chew (1995) for a historical perspective of the evolution of flexible
compensation]. Thus, over the years, the Singapore IR system has moved in
the direction of greater workplace flexibility under a tripartite framework
that guarantees some degree of IR stability.
What has this evolutionary process done to bargaining power? Although
the structure is tripartite, thus implying equal voices among all three
partners, Deyo (1981), Leggett (1993), and Wilkinson (1994) suggest that
the People's Action Party (PAP) has incorporated the labor movement
through a combination of strategies over the years, notably, through some
degree of repression, legislation, and political incorporation. By the1970s, it
became impossible to distinguish between party and labor elites (Rosa
1990). This clearly has continued in the 1990s, for instance, when the head
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of the Economic Development Board moved to become the head of the
National Trade Union Congress (NTUC), with which 97 percent of all
unions are affiliated. Clearly, then, labor is the "junior partner" in a
corporatist framework where government and employers are dominant.
However, this status does provide labor with a degree of voice in all forms
of national decision making to an extent unmatched in Asia. The degree of
voice clearly is influenced heavily by the extent to which the party's and
labor's interests are similar; e.g., in dealing with the Asian economic crisis,
.
avoiding retrenchment was a key issue for both labor and the party. At the
workplace level, unions are restrained, given the legislative restrictions on
bargaining subjects and strikes. Some have argued (Kuruvilla 1996) that
Singaporean unions may view that their influence at the national level
compensates for their lack of influence at the workplace level. The pursuit of
functional flexibility under this framework, to our knowledge, has not made
labor any weaker, given the existing institutional structure and despite the
gradual decline in trade union membership as a function of structural
changes in the economy.
Much of the focus of government policy and institutions in recent years
has been on increasing skills development and training in Singapore
through various legislative and institutional mechanisms (Kuruvilla and
Chua 1999). In response to the economic crisis, although no formal rules
have changed, the tripartite partners have chosen to emphasize retraining,
res killing, and HR development more generally in an effort to improve the
employment prospects for displaced workers. The type of flexibility
followed by Singaporean firms tends to be functional flexibility rather than
numerical flexibility.
.
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Malaysia. IR policy and practice prior to 1985. The IR institutions of the
colonial period played a critical role in developing Malaysia's postinde-
pendence (1957) IR system (Hiers and Arudsothy 1999). The primary focus
of colonial labor policy in Malaysia was the elimination of communist (and
presumptively militant) unions and the establishment of compliant and
"responsible" unions (Sharma 1996). These objectives were met through the
office of the Registrar of Trade Unions, which had wide powers to accord or
not accord registration to unions (Sharma 1996:67), and through mandating
occupation-based unions. Postindependence IR policy built on this
foundation of control over union formation but put in additional elements
to meet the goal of stability in IR for economic development and regime
maintenance. Therefore, although union federations were allowed, they
were incorporated as societies, not trade unions. These federations were not
allowed to be politically active. Hiers and Arudsothy (1999) argue that these
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policies were designed to ensure that unions would not present a threat to
the ruling coalition government.
On the bargaining front as well, IR policy was geared both to ensure
continued investment and to contain strikes for economic development. For
example, employees had the right to strike, but this right was circumscribed
by a series of administrative rules, strikes should be stopped once
conciliation or mediation proceedings commenced. At the level of the
workplace, bargaining on job assignments, promotions, transfers, and
layoff and retrenchment decisions were not allowed by the legislation, thus
ensuring that disputes regarding these subjects would not result in conflict.
Further, all collective agreements had to be recognized (given legal
standing) by the Industrial Arbitration Court, which could refuse to
recognize agreements that were inimical to national economic development
interests. Several authors (e.g., Arudsothy and Littler 1993; Kuruvilla and
Arudsothy 1995) highlight the importance of IR stability via effective
conflict management as the key basis for these workplace IR regulations
and legislation.
The principle of supremacy of economic development goals over
unfettered trade union rights continued through Malaysia's phase of
import-substitution industrialization until the middle 1970s and deepened
with the adoption of low-cost labor-intensive export-oriented industrializa-
tion predicated on foreign investment, primarily in the electronics sector.
Kuruvilla (1996) documents an increase in government oversight and
intervention in IR in terms of union formation, dispute settlement, and
various initiatives to keep labor costs low.9 There is consensus in the
literature that the demands of the export-oriented strategy and the need to
continually attract foreign investment were the prime motivations for the
government's repressive IR policy (see Frenkel and Peetz 1998).
IR and HR practices of employers and firms also reflected this low-cost
focus. Foreign employers often refused to recognize unions, intimidated
union activists, or inserted anti-union clauses in individual employment
contracts (Ariffin 1997). Further, commitment-oriented management prac-
tices, deployed in combination with favorable compensation, reduced the
perceived need for unionization (Frenkel and Peetz 1998). The growth of
9These included changing the way overtime was to be calculated and changes in overtime rates and
refusal to enact minimum-wage legislation and equal-work pay legislation. There also was a decisive
effort to ensure that unionization would not occur in the export-oriented electronics industry, the
mainstay of Malaysia's E01 strategy (e.g., banning unions in the electronics sector, increased state
intervention in union recognition and dispute resolution). For a more detailed description of the various
government initiatives to control unions during this phase, see Kuruvilla and Arudsothy (1995) and
Grace (1990).
196 / SAROSH KURUVILLA AND CHRISTOPHER L. ERICKSON
)
TABLE 4
UNION MALAYSIANIR
,
~
Union structure
Dominant IR and
HR issues
Union density and
UUlon VOice Bargaining structure
Largely
en terprise- based,
except in some
industries such as
banking; in some
industries, enterprise
unions cannot be
affiliated with
industrial unions
(e.g., electronics).
Union density has
declined gradually
from about 13.5%
in 1986 to about
11.7% in 1995.
Union voice at both
national and
workplace levels is low
given various restrictions
on union formation
and bargaining.
Largely
enterprise- based,
although industrial
unions are allowed
in some industries
such as banking
and plantations.
An environment of
extremely tight labor
markets and headlong
growth in electronics
has driven a shift away
from a low-cost focused
IR regime to a more
skills development.
focused HR system
and is reflected in both
policy and practice.
»
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contract work as employers searched for increased numerical flexibility and
the employment of guest workers, both documented and undocumented,
further reduced union power and influence (Table 4).
Recent changes. By the late 1980s, further changes in IR became apparent.
Competition from other low-cost producers forced Malaysia to adopt a more
technology-intensive export strategy. And in order to attract more techno-
logy-intensive investment, the focus of the state's IR policy turned to one of
skills development rather than cost containment and union suppression.
Government policies now focus on providing employers with incentives to
invest in training, with the introduction of the Skills Development System,
and reforming the education sector to ensure the continuous supply of skilled
workers for industrial needs. Signifying this shift in the basis of IR and HR
policy, the Ministry of Labour was renamed the Ministry of Human
Resource Development (Arudsothy and Littler 1993).
Foreign multinationals that dominate employment in the export sector,
they account for over 50 percent of manufactured exports, have introduced
new forms of work organization and progressive HR practices, many of
which require greater worker involvement but in a nonunion setting
(Kuru villa 1996). Therefore, the gradual evolution to a high-skill and
"positive" HR policy system is underway in a nonunion environment. 10
There has been great interest in performance-based pay in Malaysia,
given the concern that productivity growth is slower than wage growth.
>
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)
)
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IOKuruvilla (1996) documents in detail the new forms of HR management systems in the electronics
industry (Malaysia's largest export industry and its largest employer) and several studies by Rajah and
colleagues also describe this shift (see Salih, Rajah, and Young 1988).
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A tripartite accord in 1996 sought to expand the use of perform.ance-based
pay, which is currently practiced in only 1 or 2 percent of Malaysian firms.
Recent (1998) legislative changes to the definition of the wage were designed
to increase incentives among employers to adopt performance-based pay
schemes.
In general, the move toward highly flexible IR and HR practices can be
discerned in Malaysia, similar to the path taken by Singapore. The Asian
economic crisis has further intensified the drive to restructure IR and HR
practices to enhance both functional and numerical flexibility. During the
economic crisis, firms restructured their businesses to a considerable extent
and focused on reducing the labor force, introducing labor-saving technol-
ogy, and preparing for a more skill-intensive workforce (Peetz and Todd
2000). However, unlike in Singapore, Malaysian unions do not have any
institutional bulwarks against major membership losses. Union density has
been low in Malaysia, and the labor movement has not had a significant
voice at either national or local levels (Kuruvilla 1996). Peetz and Todd
(2000) note that union membership declined by 1 percent (from 11 to 10
percent) during the economic crisis. Curiously, one consequence of the
economic crisis has been the introduction of tripartism for the first time,
although it is a limited form; the tripartite committee monitors retrench-
ment and encourages firms to pursue alternatives to retrenchment. It is not
clear whether this form of tripartism will remain once the crisis is over;
Peetz and Todd (2000) argue that this is an important question for future
research on Malaysia.
.
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The Philippines. IR policy and practice prior to the 1980s. There is
evidence to suggest that industrial peace was the driving focus of Philippine
IR policy at its inception. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR),
established in 1936, was created primarily to handle labor disputes and
Ramos (1981) argues that the CIR's primary function was "to contain the
growth and militancy of the labor movement" (p. 443). The immediate
postwar era saw a rise in industrial disputes during a period of
reconstruction under an import-substitution industrialization (ISI) pro-
gram. The ISI program lasted until the 1960s and during this phase the
Philippines witnessed its fastest growth, an average of 11 percent per year.
To deal with the rising number of industrial disputes, the state initially
put in place a system of bilateral collective bargaining, based largely on the
Wagner Act in the United States. The act itself was called the Industrial
Peace Act of 1953, clearly signifying the underlying logic of the IR system:
to promote industrial peace. In fact, the preamble to the law clearly states
its aim "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest" (Ramos 1981:451).
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Thus a U.S.-style system of collective bargaining was introduced and this
lasted until the declaration of martial law in 1972. From less than 50
collective-bargaining contracts in 1953, the number increased to 852
contracts in 1972. This was accompanied by various pieces of labor and
social welfare legislation, in particular minimum-wage legislation. Over the
years, however, the minimum wage set the standard for wage negotiations
in different areas; consequently, the wage-setting process became tripartite
as employers, unions, and the government bargained over the minimum,
wage to be set. Clearly, however, the focus of IR was the preservation of
labor peace.
Martial law in 1972 changed the nature of IR drastically. Intensification
of the country's export-oriented industrialization program in the 1970s
brought with it several changes in IR policy (Villegas 1988; Macaraya and
Ofreneo 1993). First, there was the focus on suppressing labor and on
keeping costs low. This was achieved by banning strikes and introducing
compulsory arbitration to guarantee foreign investors industrial peace
(Villegas 1988). Various provisions, including the power of the Secretary of
Labor to issue injunctions against strikes, weakened the ability of labor to
push through their demands in several industries. Second, to maintain
stability, the highly fragmented and decentralized unions were restructured
along industrial union lines and all trade unions were required to be
affiliated with the government-controlled Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (Kuruvilla 1996; Villegas 1988; Ofreneo 1994). Third, various
labor laws and standards were revised downward to continue to attract
foreign investors to capitalize on the Philippines competitive advantage of
low labor costs.
Although the more restrictive aspects of the Marcos regime were lifted
with the ascendancy of Corazon Aquino in 1986, Philippine IR policy
continued its low-cost focus, with several restrictions on the ability of
unions to strike. In essence, the underlying logic of IR regulation, which had
been to create a U.S.-style level playing field, underwent a change during the
export-orientation regime toward emphasizing low-costs and tilting the
balance heavily in favor of employers (Kuruvilla 1996) (Table 5).
,
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Recent changes. When we examine firm-level policies during the 1990s, it
is clear that firms were focusing heavily on "flexibilizing" IR further, given
the competition from China and Vietnam in low-cost assembly operations
that were the mainstay of the Philippines' export-oriented industrialization
program. Numerical flexibility appears to be the key term here. In a wide-
ranging article on globalization's impact, Barranco-Fernando (1994-1995)
documents the trends in practices. Two of the most pervasive forms of
,
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. TABLE S
PHILIPPINES IR
,
Union density and
union voice
IR and
HR issues
) Although union density
figures suggest II %
unionization, less
than 600,000 workers
are covered under
colIective-bargaining
contracts.
Union voice is low
at workplace level and
at national level.
)
.
Union structure
Highly fragmented
labor movement,
with over 5000 unions,
150 federations and
labor centers,
organized on many
different enterprise,
industrial, regional,
and occupational
lines.
Bargaining structure
Limited
en terpri se-based
collective bargaining
in large firms and
public sector, with
tripartite negotiations
on mmllllum wage
fixation.
Union avoidance
policies, particularly
in foreign-dominated
export oriented
electronics sector,
coupled with union
suppression during
martial law years.
,
employment flexibility include subcontracting and labor-only subcontract-
ing. Under this system, workers are engaged on short-term contracts via a
labor service contractor such that, they cannot be made permanent (the
labor rules define permanent worker as one who works in continuous
employment for more than 6 months). While Barranco-Fernando docu-
ments the large increases in outsourcing and labor-only contracting, a
recent survey by the Bureau of Employment and Labor Statistics suggests
that in manufacturing roughly 25 percent of the jobs are done by labor-
service contractors.
The "casualization" of what were permanent jobs also was accompanied
by an increasing anti-union stance taken by employers (see Ofreneo and
Ortiz 1998). This movement clearly weakened trade unionism at both
national and workplace levels. Collective-bargaining coverage declined
from 621,000 in 1993 to 540,000 in 1998 (note that the number of union
members was 3.6 million in 1998). And there is anecdotal evidence that the
large-scale retrenchments and subcontracting resulted in losses of trade
union members (Kuruvilla et al. 2000). Further, in the last election, none of
the candidates supported by labor won their seats in congress.
The Asian economic crisis clearly has accelerated these trends. In a more
recent investigation of the effects of the crisis on IR, case studies of 16 firms
in diverse industries (Kuruvilla et al. 2000) suggest dramatic efforts to reduce
head count, increased subcontracting, and a restructuring of IR in view of
increasing low-cost competition from China and Vietnam. Clearly, there is a
focus on the workplace that is driving change in Philippine IR. And the crisis
has forced the Philippines to accelerate the move toward numerical flexibility
driven by the need to cut costs in conjunction with an economic development
strategy that is still based on the competitive advantage of low costs.
~
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It is against the weakness of the trade union movement that the efforts at
tripartism during the economic crisis must be evaluated. The aims of
tripartism are to help alleviate the effects of the crisis but also to promote
numerical flexibility at the same time. The tripartite social accord signed in
February 1998 eased restrictions on layoffs to promote economic restruc-
turing while improving social protection through the expansion of social
security. The social accord also encouraged firms to use layoffs as a last
resort and to explore alternatives to layoffs. The Philippines also has seen
the increased use of labor-management councils (rather like works councils;
but with a more limited mandate), introduced by employers with govern-
ment encouragement but with limited union acceptance (Erickson et al.
2000). While it is too early to evaluate the effect of these councils on labor-
management cooperation, this remains an interesting question for future
research.
;
India. IR policy and practice prior to 1991. In his wide-ranging
examination of the colonial origins of Indian IR policy, DeSousa (1999)
highlights how the Indian government built on colonial labor institutions
and regulations to fashion an IR system that sought to control industrial
conflict through a plethora of protective labor legislation, influenced by the
strong ties between the major political parties and labor forged in the
struggle for independence.
Under this regime, many aspects of workplace IR and HR were regulated,
including detailed laws on safety and health, leave, dismissal, and layoffs, so
as to avoid sources of conflict [see DeSousa (1999) for a detailed historical
evolution of Indian labor law]. The Industrial Disputes Act mandated that
employers could layoff workers only temporarily, 180 days with compen-
sation, and provided that employers must seek government permission,
rarely given in view of the close ties between labor and political parties,
which was for retrenchment and even closure of factories. The method of
dispute settlement also reflects the underlying purpose of this act: ensuring
that conflict did not undermine economic development. Thus, although the
right to strike existed, it could be exercised only after due notice and the
strike had to be stopped when either party requested third-party interven-
tion through government conciliation officers. If conciliation failed, the
government had the power to refer the dispute to compulsory arbitration or
to a labor court or industrial tribunal, depending on the nature of the
dispute, for final decision. Thus laws regarding labor standards, protection
of employees against unfair dismissal, and retrenchment and closure, in
theory, would reduce the potential sources of conflict, and should conflict
arise, the dispute-settlement mechanism would be able to contain and
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resolve it. In addition, given the absence of social security legislation, and in
view of the government's goals to protect employment, the costs of social
policy such as retirement (e.g., the Provident Fund Act of 1952), medical
care, and to a certain extent child care (the Indian Factories Act of 1948
mandates child care facilities in large factories) were thrust on the employer.
This worker-centered IR policy was sustained to a large extent by the
country's ISI strategy, which emphasized the growth and long-term
development of heavy capital goods industries in the public sector with
largely indigenous technology (Sodhi 1993), coupled with a policy of
industrial licensing, import controls, and restrictions on foreign ownership
that protected both public- and private-sector firms from international
competition. Therefore, as long as ISI was in place, the higher costs and
the relative lack of flexibility imposed by the IR regulations did not pose a
serious problem because Indian manufacturers did not have to compete in
the international market (Hiers and Kuruvilla 2000). The protectionism
afforded to manufacturers also resulted in the growth of inefficient firms
(Venkataratnam 1993). In IR terms, these inefficiencies were reflected in
excess employment in public sector industries such as power and in the
private sector in an inability to negotiate the introduction of labor-saving
new technology or rationalization and labor cost-control strategies that
involved workforce reduction, along with a high incidence of strikes.
Further, the absence of sole-bargaining-agent legislation created a
multiplicity of unions at each workplace; unions competed with each
other for membership in a given workplace, resulting in highly conflict-
ridden IR because the conditions for a stable partnership between
employers and unions did not exist (see Ramaswamy 1983; Venkitarat-
nam, 1993).
Thus, although the initial goal of labor policy was to provide workers
with a high degree of protection and ensure some degree of stability in terms
of both employment for workers and conflict avoidance, collaborative
labor-management relations did not emerge. It should be noted, however,
that there was more diversity in IR regulation than the picture painted
earlier-largely because the different states in India enact their own IR laws
and also because of differing institutional histories in different states. For
example, trade unions in Mumbai (Bombay) historically have been quite
different in their orientation toward collective bargaining relative to trade
unions in Calcutta or other parts of India. Besides regional differences, there
are also institutional differences across industries (Table 6).
t
Recent changes. In 1991, Indian economic policy witnessed a dramatic
turn with the dismantling of the 40-year-old ISI program and the adoption
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TABLE 6
INDIAN IR PRE-1991
Union density and
umon vOice Union structure
Union density at 2-6%
as a percentage of
the nonagricultural
workforce but about
38% as a percentage
of formal sector
workers.
Union voice high
given symbiotic ties
between unions and
political parties at
national level and high
at workplace level given
strong legislative support
for unions; unions also
had "positional"power
given higher density
rates in specific industries.
Unions structured
on enterprise,
industrial, political,
and regional lines;
all major political
parties have trade
union arm, and
many trade unions
headed by
politicians; no sale
bargaining agent
legislation, resulting
in considerable
inter-union rivalry.
Bargaining structure
A mixture of industrial
and enterprise
bargaining; although
legislation provides
for tripartite
structures and works
council-type
institutions, in
practice none
followed.
IR and HR issues
Highly conflictual
labor relations given
the intense inter-union
rivalry; growth of
inefficient practices
as public-sector
firms and some
private-sector
firms were shielded
from competition.
of a liberalized open economy.ll The effects of such a major change in
economic policy after 45 years of ISI have been dramatic. Overnight, Indian
businesses have been threatened by international competition that they are
not prepared to face. These pressures have resulted in major debates
regarding IR policy and have brought about a shift in the relative power of
business and labor. IR legislation reform is on the agenda, given the
pressure from both employers and the WorId Bank to allow an "exit policy"
(to allow employers to retrench workers or close industries) (Mathur 1993).
A tripartite committee formed for this purpose has recommended the
creation of a safety net for retraining of retrenched workers and for
IIYenkataratnam (1993), Sodhi (1993), and Mathur (1993) highlight the changes. These include the
following: Licensing of industries was largely removed, the rules regarding monopoly restrictions were
relaxed, restrictions on the ceiling on foreign investment were removed, and the public sector was opened
to privatization. Free entry and exit of firms in all industries (except a few strategic ones) are now
allowed. In addition to these reforms, trade policy was revamped to promote exports and free trade, the
Indian currency was made fully convertible (free floating), and the restrictions on imports of several
goods were liberalized. Fiscal policy was amended to reduce the fiscal deficit, control the underground
economy (estimated to be one-fifth the size of the economy), and reduce subsidies to agricultural
products, and several price controls were removed. Financial markets were liberalized, banking regu-
lations were reformed, and stock markets were freed up from government control.
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retrenchment compensation, although the legislation has not been changed
to date (Mathur 1993; Hiers and Kuruvilla 2000). .
Moreover, IR practices are also undergoing change. One significant
outcome of structural adjustment and liberalization has been the employer
push for workforce reduction. Given the inability to retrench, employers
have introduced voluntary retirement schemes (VRSs) to shed excess labor.
Although precise estimates of the number of people on VRSs are not
available, Venkataratnam (1993) projected that a total of 5 million jobs will
be lost through VRSs in the public sector. As of end 1997, about 1 million
public-sector employees had utilized VRSs. Hiers and Kuruvilla (2000) also
note the increased importance of numerical and functional flexibility in
employer strategies in the private sector in particular.
Employer practices are more aggressive than previously demonstrated.
The number of lockouts has increased dramatically, even as strikes have
declined (Venkataratnam 1993). In addition, in order to avoid unionization,
employers are promoting workers into administrative and supervisory ranks
to take them outside the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act (Venkat-
aratnam 1993). There are also increased efforts of employers to invest in joint
consultation for productivity improvement. Venkataratnam suggests that
for the first time employers feel that the government is on their side and that
this has brought about what many call "emplo>,er militancy," with collective-
bargaining contracts showing an ascendancy of management rights.
The beginning of a government-business coalition, in contrast to the
previous government-labor coalition, is increasingly apparent. The tradi-
tionallink between unions and political parties (each major political party
has its trade union arm) provides the labor movement with considerable
voice despite the low density figures. The government-labor coalition has
weakened considerably given the state's enthusiastic support for economic
liberalization and labor's opposition to it. In the state of Maharashtra, for
the first time the government has declared several private-sector firms as
"essential and public utilities," permitting a ban on strikes in these sectors
(Hiers and Kuruvilla 2000). In addition, Mathur (1993) suggests an
increased incidence of union avoidance policies by employers.
Clearly, the IR system is exhibiting tensions as it attempts to break with the
rigid existing policies and practices. The need to compete both domestically
and globally with the best in the world has forced Indian employers to strive
for increased numerical flexibility, and this has been manifested in the need to
reduce head count, restructure IR, attempt labor-management collaboration,
and in some cases avoid unions. Hiers and Kuruvilla (2000), in a wide-
ranging survey of Indian industry in 1997 (16 firms in 5 industries), provide
numerous examples of the movement toward numerical flexibility and a clear
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increase in greenfield nonunion plants. Another recent study covering 300
collective-bargaining agreements in the Indian private sector found that one
in two included provisions for greater numerical flexibility and closer
cooperation in the labor-management relationship (Venkataratnam 1997). In
addition, although the legislation has yet to be changed, the firm-level
strategies emphasize numerical flexibility more than anything else.
In essence, these practices have accentuated the diversity existing in
Indian IR systems considerably. Bhattacherjee (2001) suggests that there is.
so much variation in the Indian IR scenario that it is no longer appropriate
to think of one "national" Indian IR system. Overall, the evidence clearly
suggests a shift away from maintaining labor peace as a key underlying
imperative of the IR system and towards the enhancement of firm-level
competitiveness through increases in numerical flexibility as India becomes
more integrated into the world economy.
)
China. IR policy and practice prior to 1980s. China's IR system must be
understood in terms of its economic and political organization. Although
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) was set up as early
as 1925, its incorporation into the Chinese communist party (O'Leary
1994) defined the labor movement's role within a state-dominated ISI
policy in a centrally planned closed economy. The trade union constitu-
tion's preamble states the role of the union rather clearly: "The Trade
Unions of China are the mass organization of the working class led by the
party and are the transmission belts between the party and the masses"
(Littler and Lockett 1983). Therefore, although the unions played a
variety of economic and political roles, the role of transmission belt
(communication between the party and workers) was the most central
(Littler and Lockett 1983).
The transmission belt ostensibly contributed to the development of the
state's industrial, employment, and welfare goals. The main characteristics
of the system included state ownership of industrial enterprises, the implicit
guarantee of employment for workers, an administrated allocation of labor
irrespective of the price mechanism [see Jackson (1994)] for an elaborating,
centralized state planning of production and distribution, centralized wage
setting and HR policy determination, a rigid labor market with little
interenterprise or interregional mobility, and the absence of price- or
efficiency-driven controls over industry. Although the emphasis varied over
time, the broad industrial policy that followed was a mixture of heavy
industrialization in the core sectors of the economy coupled with both
import-substitution industries and small-scale industrialization to promote
economic growth in the rural sector (Chiu and Frenkel 2000).
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The administrative bureaucracy at central and regional levels governed
industry, whereas the party and the trade unions developed parallel
bureaucracies. In IR terms, however, the workplace specifically, the work
unit the Danwei, was most important (Warner 1987; Ban and Morishima
1992). At the Danwei level, employment was lifelong and beyond-retire-
ment meant that the employee's children were encouraged to take the
employee's place (Jackson I994)-and the enterprise was responsible for the
provision of housing and all welfare, medical, and retirement benefits, as
well as for social and entertainment needs. Thus the enterprise shouldered
many of the responsibilities that are the province of national social security
in other nations. Warner (1987) suggests that the Danwei provided a sense
of identity for the industrial worker based on cradle-to-grave welfare
benefits. The term iron rice bowl is used to describe this inclusive IR system
(Jackson 1994). Note, also, the often-heard quotation that the Chinese
industrial enterprise was not organized to make profits but to fulfill the
economic and social policy of the state.
Within this system, IR consisted of a dualistic structure of co-determi-
nation. Warner (1987) provides an analysis of IR in the Chinese factory,
which we summarize here. The trade union focused on day-to-day shop
floor problems but walked a fine line between its responsibilities of
educating the workers, ensuring success of the enterprise, and ensuring that
management of the enterprise did not exploit workers. The union dealt with
matters such as grievances and. decisions regarding social activities.
Workers' congresses composed of representatives of workers, met about
four times a year and had responsibility for strategic issues, such as the
scrutiny of plans and budgets, decisions on enterprise funds for welfare
activities, changes in organizational structure and payment systems, and
election of the enterprise director and other key management personnel.
Thus the workers' congresses made key decisions that trade unions carried
out on a regular basis (although there was considerable variation in the
degree to which workers' congresses were involved in decision making). The
glue that held this together was the presence of party members in each
enterprise, who often were responsible, through their presence in trade
unions, workers' congresses, and management, for all important decisions.
The combination of administrative labor allocation and the iron rice bowl
produced a rigid and inflexible system within the enterprise and outside as
well. The absence of numerical flexibility via allocation and recruitment
policies was further reinforced by the absence of labor mobility given the
household registration system, which only permitted workers to be
employed permanently in their area of residence. This has been cited as
the "greatest institutional barrier to free labor mobility" (Jackson 1994).
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Thus the objectives of IR policy was in some sense to support the economic
and social structure that communism built-in other words, mobilization of
the mass of workers behind economic policies. Note, however, that there
were numerous differences under different regimes and across different
industries in how workers' congresses and trade unions operated (Jackson
and Littler 1991). For instance, trade union rights and roles were banned
during the cultural revolution (restored under the modernization period of
Deng) and there was some degree of loosening in IR as Deng sought to giv~
enterprises greater control over their management after 1978 [see Jackson
(1994) for a more extensive description of liberalization during this period].
By and large, however, the need for flexibility in the IR system was absent,
given the absence of competitive pressures in the system (Table 7).
Recent changes. The Chinese IR system has been in considerable ferment
since the opening up of the Chinese economy after 1978 and in particular
after 1983. There is a lot of research on the change in economic
development strategy, and we will not revisit that research here (e.g.,
Becker and Gao 1989; Chan 1995). However, the change in economic policy
brought about a greater decentralization in the state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), which were allowed to manage themselves more independently, and
an increase in the number of foreign-investment enterprises (FIEs), foreign-
owned joint-venture firms in export, and special economic zones all over the
country. Decentralization in the state sector implied changes in IR and HR
practices, with new practices that are increasingly focused on getting a
higher degree of numerical and functional flexibility. Jackson (1994), for
instance, documents the early progress in instituting numerical flexibility by
introducing the contract system to replace the lifetime employment system
and the "flexibilization" of wages. The joint ventures brought with them
flexible IR and HR practices from abroad. Further, as part of these reforms,
the Chinese government enacted a new labor law in 1994 that essentially
TABLE 7
CHINESE IR PRE-1980s
Union density and
vOice Union structure Bargaining structure
Highly centralized
rules regarding wages
and HR, but localized
bargaining over other
aspects.
IR issues
The iron rice
bowl system in
state-owned
enterprises, highly
rigid HR and
IR practices.
State-sponsored
unionism with density
about 70%.
Unions had a strong
voice with respect to
labor welfare policies
in workplaces.
Based on the
structure of the
state administrative
units.
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sought to create a new IR system within the socialist market economy, but
implementation of this law has not been uniform (Chiu and Frenkel 2000).
In terms of IR legislation, the government's focus in the foreign-
investment sector is to keep basic labor protection and welfare laws as
similar as possible to the state-owned sector (Chan, Li, and Sculli 1989).
Thus, in joint-venture firms (although there are differences in rules across
economic zones and provinces), there are detailed rules regarding IR and
HR practices. There is a ceiling regarding wage payment currently set at
150 percent of state-sector wages and, in effect, a legislated system regarding
employee benefits that parallels the state-provided benefits at the Danwei.
Every enterprise must have a union, which can attend the board meetings of
the companies and which gets a company-supported office, 2 percent of the
wage bill, and the salaries of union reps are paid by the company. The
purposes of unions here are the same, to ensure the success of the enterprise,
while there is also a strong emphasis on ensuring that workers do not get
exploited and that their basic rights are protected.12
However, workplace IR and HR practices in the FIE sector show
considerable variety, often affected by country of origin. Thus Western
multinationals have a very different reputation as employers than Korean
and Taiwanese companies (Chiu and Frenkel 2000). Variation is facilitated
by weak and haphazard enforcement of labor legislation. Wage setting
(subject to the minimums and the stipulated ceiling of 150 percent) is
determined by the enterprise. On average, in 1995, wages in the FIE sector
were about 1.45 times the wages in the state-owned sector (Chiu and
Frenkel 2000). Other employment practices are completely within the
discretion of the employer, subject to the basic standards legislation.
Despite the ACFTU directive to organize every workplace, only 36 percent
of workplaces have been organized so far, with the labor movement
showing little ability, or interest, in speeding up the organization rate, and
as several observers have noted, it has few resources with which to do so.
Most important, there is little evidence of guaranteed lifetime employment
in this sector, beyond the possibility of renewal of short-term contracts.
Employment contracts are short term, highly specific, impose restrictions on
their employees, and can be changed unilaterally by the employer, and in
several cases, no contracts are signed at all [Chiu and Frenkel, 2000; for
example, they note that in Xiamen (Fujian Province), over 90 percent of
FIEs have not provided employment contracts].
12For a more detailed description of FIE IR and HR management, see Chan, Li, and Sculli (1989),
O'Leary (1998), andChan (1998). However, also see Seung (2000) for the latest rules here.
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There is increased variation in IR within the state-owned sector as well
(O'Leary 1998). There has been pressure to restructure IR and HR
practices in this sector to increase productivity, upgrade skills, restructure
work practices, and increase numerical flexibility (Han and Morishima
1992; Chan 1995). Despite regulations to limit management autonomy to
layoff workers, there have been widespread violations leading to increasing
unemployment and worker protests (Lee 2000). In some large state
enterprises that have restructured, IR and HR practices emphasi2e
productivity and numerical flexibility, with wages tied to performance,
extensive use of contract labor, and massive retrenchment; for example,
Baoshan Steelworks reduced its workforce from 40,000 to 17,000 in 10
years (Freund 1998). There is a much greater variance in earnings,
especially within industries, based on the different economic circumstances
of firms. In other smaller state-owned enterprises that recently have been
bought by foreign concerns, notably in the low-cost labor-intensive
manufacturing sector dominated by investors from Hong Kong and
Taiwan (this sector is most responsible for China's astounding export
performance in the 1990s), IR and HR management is characterized by low
wages, refusal to follow minimum-wage laws, blatant violation of labor law
provisions, high rates of wildcat strikes and labor disputes, and very little
job security (AMRC 1998). Lee (2000) documents that in these sectors,
changes in IR and HR emphasizing numerical flexibility have taken a heavy
toll on the workers.13 Chan (1998) suggests that the employment system in
the state sector is clearly in transition and has already shifted away from the
state-oriented system, but the key challenge is in the method of adjustment
to the market economy and the considerable variation in the ability of
different SOE managements to adapt.
The labor movement in China has been slow to adapt to these changes.
On the one hand, the numerical flexibility-enhancing strategies followed by
SOEs have hindered union membership. In addition, decentralization of
decision making down to the enterprise level has not been matched by
adequate autonomy for unions or the right to strike. On the other hand,
although there is state support for the extension of collective bargaining, the
ACFTU has been very slow to organize, as we have already seen. Chan
(1998) notes that the labor movement has limited funds and limited
organizers and tends to view new organization as a bureaucratic exercise. In
the FIE sector, many labor regulations are not enforced given that
provincial governments believe that enforcing such laws may drive off
13Detailed reviews of the changes in practices also can be found in Child (1995).
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foreign investment (Chan and Senser 1997:107). Thus the power of the labor
movement has been weakened by the changes (Seung 2000).
The net effect of the changes in economic policy and labor law has been
an increase in the diversity of IR and HR practices in China and diversity
within state enterprises and between SOEs and FIEs. In effect, there is a
clear transition from centralized IR and a highly welfarist (iron rice bowl)
and rigid system to a more profit-driven, flexibility-oriented IR and HR
system [see Han and Morishima (1992) for a discussion of specific changes].
There is tremendous variation in IR reform and differential progress across
industries and sectors, but the trend is fairly clear: The focus is on increased
numerical, functional, and wage flexibility.
What is less well known is the nature of IR and HR in the rapidly
expanding nonforeign, private sector of the Chinese economy, especially in
large firms. Zhao and Nichols (1998:97) convey the degree of experimen-
tation rather well in their textile industry study: "The managements' labor
control strategies owe something to long-established cultural forms; they
owe something to a more recent socialist practice and ideology; and they
owe something to a mixture of practices in the capitalist world." This
suggests that it is still too early to discern any degree of "system stability."
However, all the evidence taken together indicates that the most salient
constraint facing IR in China has shifted to the need to enhance enterprise
competitiveness.
Discussion
These cases permit us to draw several conclusions. First, it is clear that in
most of these countries, the initial primary goal of the IR system was to
maintain labor peace and, more generally, industrial stability. The stated
rationale for the need for stability varied from nation to nation. For
example, in India and the Philippines, the rationale was to channel conflict
away from strikes to third-party dispute-settlement mechanisms given that
strikes were seen to hinder economic development. In Singapore, industrial
conflict was seen as a deterrent to foreign investment, whereas in Malaysia
arid South Korea, there were apparent political imperatives for IR stability.
Note, also, that in many countries the IR system began to be institution-
alized only in the postwar period, coinciding with independence for some of
the countries. Table 8 indicates the dates of institutionalization of the IR
systems in this sample, and shows approximate dates of the recent changes.
And, similar to the experience of the advanced industrial nations in other
regions (Katz, Kuruvilla, and Turner, 1994; Erickson and Kuruvilla, 1998a),
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TABLE 8
CHANGES IN IR SYSTEMS
Country
Japan
South Korea
Singapore
Malaysia
Philippines
India
China
Institutionalization
of old system
1930s
1945
1965
1960s
1945
1947
1949
System change
1990s
1987
1980s
1980s
1991
1985
NOTE: The choice of dates for the institutionalization of the old system is controversial, as noted in the text. We have
focused on independence, when several significant new laws in many of these countries were enacted. But industrial
relations existed in these countries even before independence, under colonialism in India, Malaysia, Singapore, and
the Philippines and under Japanese occupation in South Korea. In addition, our choice of the 1950s for the
institutionalization of the Japanese system rests primarily on the development of the practices of lifetime employ-
ment and the highly developed internal labor markets in Japanese companies. Yet these practices built on the
pre-war Japanese IR system.
the IR systems of these countries experienced long periods of stability
before the dramatic and in some cases fundamental changes of the 1980s
and 1990s, as Table 8 indicatesl4.
It is also clear that there have been major changes in the industrial
relations systems of these countries in the last decades. Table 9 provides a
simple listing of the changes in IR, suggesting that, similar to the experience
of the advanced industrial nations, the 1990s have been a time of ferment in
Asian IR systems as well. In addition, as Table 9 suggests, what has changed
in IR varies across the countries. In some countries the changes in IR and
HR can be seen in legislative changes, but often change is manifested in the
strategies of the parties. Irrespective of what has changed (and we do not
have a common definition of what must happen for a change to occur), the
cases clearly suggest that many of the changes in each nation have been
14In making the above argument, we have implicitly treated the institutionalization of industrial
relations in many of these countries as being co-terminus with their independence. Yet, industrial
relations regulation and legislation existed in these countries before their independence. And, in most
cases, the colonial era legislation was the basis for the post-colonial legislation, and many of the post-
colonial industrial relations institutions in these countries built on colonial institutions. Previous work
that has examined the impact of colonialism on industrial relations systems of developing countries (as in
three of the countries in this paper) makes the argument that the purpose of colonial industrial relations
was for Singapore, Malaysia, and India, to encourage the growth of responsible unionism and to limit
industrial conflict, and both of these goals were also the goals of the post-colonial state (Kuruvilla and
Mundell, 1999). Yet, independence allowed these states to make autonomous changes in their IR
systems, even if the changes were not major, and hence we treat the date of institutionalization to be the
same as the date of independence.
TABLE 9
NATURE OF IR SYSTEM CHANGE
Change in structures a Change in strategies" Change in
Change in government
Country Un Er Bg Un Er legislation involvement
Japan N N N N Y N N
South Korea Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Singapore Y N Y N Y Y Y
Malaysia Y N Y N Y Y Y
Philippines Y N N Y N Y Y
India N N UD Y Y UD UD
China Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
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"Un = union; Er = employer; Bg = bargaining; Y = yes; N = no; UD = undetermined.
nontrivial. Moreover, the similarity in timing with the changes in Western
IR systems hints strongly at the underlying common cause of increased
competitive pressures due to an integrating world economy.
Consistent with our argument, the cases suggest that the most salient
constraint facing Asian IR in the 1990s is the need for enhanced firm-level
competitiveness through increased numerical and functional flexibility. The
causes of the need for numerical and/or functional flexibility varied across
the nations. In the Indian and Chinese cases, this was due to liberalization
of the economies to integrate with the global economy. For example, in
India, the changes in the IR system can be linked directly to economic
liberalization, the need to be more competitive when integrated into the
global economy, an argument that is also true of the Chinese case. In
Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines, which have been more open to
the global economy than India and China (by the traditional measures of
trade as a percentage of gross domestic product and foreign direct
investment as a percentage of gross domestic product), the reliance on
key industries that are critically affected by changes in world demand
(semiconductors, electronics assembly) has driven a continuous movement
toward greater numerical and functional flexibility in IR to maintain firm-
level competitiveness. In South Korea, democratization and the increased
militancy of trade unions hastened the erosion of South Korea's competitive
advantages in a range of industries such that employers began the push for
IR adjustment in late 1980s. In Japan, competitive pressures in several
industries, notably automobiles and electronic components, resulted in a
shift of production outside Japan in the late 1980s, and the recession in the
economy thereafter created pressures for changes in long-established
patterns of IR. Further, in most countries, the recent economic crisis has
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only accelerated these movements for change in IR particularly in Japan,
the Philippines, South Korea, and Malaysia. Despite the varying causal
factors, in every single country in this study, restructuring and IR and HR
changes started to occur in the late 1980s and 1990s. As the cases suggest,
there is little doubt that the changes in IR and HR policy and practice
appear to be driven by the need of firms to be more flexible, in either
numerical or functional terms, in order to be more competitive.
Notably, even in the cases where the Asian financial crisis has seen a~
upsurge in tripartite arrangements (Malaysia, South Korea, and the
Philippines) or where the crisis has played a watershed role in the design
of new IR systems (South Korea), these arrangements also have stressed
numerical flexibility (see Erickson and Kuruvilla 1998b). As noted earlier,
we want to stress that our emphasis on the imperative to enhance numerical
and functional flexibility as a result of shifts in the salient constraints is
necessarily a generalization that requires some qualification. Clearly, the
particular institutional structure that provided labor peace and industrial
stability in Japan was well suited to the development of functional
flexibility, and this type of flexibility spread to some other Asian nations
as well (most notably South Korea) under the old systems through imitation
and under the influence of Japanese multinationals. We contrast this case
with the United States, where the institutions of job-control unionism
maintained labor peace while allowing for a great deal of numerical but
minimal functional flexibility through use of the layoff-recall system. The
shift in constraints has led to an increased emphasis on numerical flexibility
in most of the countries, whether or not a particular system started from a
high level of functional flexibility, although Singapore and Malaysia at least
have also taken actions to increase functional flexibility during the system
change. The difference, we argue, is that the need for flexibility is now a
primary concern rather than an institutional side effect of the need to
maintain labor peace and stability. The nature of flexibility (numerical or
functional) under the old systems and the primary "flexibilization"
emphases under the new systems are depicted in Table 10.
We have argued that the most salient constraint in the 1990s has been the
need to enhance firm-level competitiveness by increasing both numerical
and, in some cases, functional flexibility. An alternative explanation is that
it is not a shift in constraints that we are seeing but rather a reassertion of
employer control. This argument suggests that the reassertion of employer
control may have been brought about by the following: Increased
competitive pressures weakened labor's ability to achieve its aims through
strikes, strikes are decreasing in Asia, and hence, stability is not of any great
concern anymore. With weaker labor, employers are able to assert
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TABLE 10
FLEXIBILITY STRATEGIES
Old system New system
Country
Japan
South Korea
Singapore
Malaysia
Philippines
India
China
Numerical Functional Numerical Functional
J
J
J
+
+ +
+
++
+
+
+ +
NOTE: See text and Table 8 for dates of institutionalization of old system and for dates of system change. A J under a
type of flexibility in the old system means that the given type of flexibility existed to a significant extent in the country
before the system change. A + under a type of flexibility in the new system means that the given type of flexibility is
being increased as part of the system change. Blank spaces in both columns basically indicate that a system was rigid.
themselves and increase their bargaining power. There is much to support
this argument-lower strike rates and considerable evidence that enhanced
competitive pressures have weakened labor. However, Asian labor, with
some exceptions, has never been particularly strong, and in most countries,
employers always have had greater bargaining power. We see these cases as
suggesting that given the need for increased numerical flexibility in
particular, actions by employers and some governments have caused labor
to be even weaker than before.
Characterizing the Change. The direction of change. All the cases suggest
a movement toward increased numerical and/or functional flexibility in IR,
and in this respect, these nations evidence similarities with the advanced
industrial world. In Asia, however, the search for flexibility has not
necessarily been coterminal with decentralization in collective bargaining, as
in Europe and North America (noted by Katz, 1993). This is largely because
most Asian IR systems have never had a history of centralized bargaining.
Rather, the locus of bargaining always has tended more toward the
workplace level. In the few cases where industry-wide bargaining dominated
(e.g., in the banking sectors in India and Malaysia), the locus of bargaining
gradually is evidencing some shift to the enterprise level in the 1990s (Peetz
and Todd 2000; Hiers and Kuruvilla 2000). In China, where the wages of
the state sector were highly centralized prior to 1984, there have since been
several sets of changes leading to decentralization of wage setting, with
enterprises given more power to decide on their own wages (China and
Vietnam were notable exceptions to the otherwise decentralized systems in
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Asia). Otherwise, however, movement toward decentralization is not a
common phenomenon given the decentralized workplace model that
previously characterized Asian IR systems.
In fact, there is even evidence of some degree of recentralization in Asia,
with the introduction of tripartite arrangements (in South Korea, the
Philippines, and Malaysia) consequent to the Asian economic crisis.
However, it is too early to make a decisive call on whether these tripartite
mechanisms are here to stay. In the Korean situation, tripartism has
occurred as part of a package of far-reaching changes in the Korean IR
system, but in the Malaysian and Philippine cases, tripartism appears to be
more of a reaction to the high degree of job loss caused by the economic
crisis. However, one of the foci of recent tripartite arrangements has been
negotiations to increase functional flexibility, apart from encouraging
employers to use layoffs only as a last resort.
Approaches to flexibility. Although there is a general movement toward
greater flexibility in IR, the nature of the flexibility being sought varies
across sectors, industries, and countries. Given the wide variation in the
types of industries and firms operating in each country, it is logical to expect
the existence of different types of flexibility within each nation, but it is also
possible to examine which form of flexibility predominates in a given
nation. In India and the Philippines, a movement toward the numerical type
of flexibility appears to predominate. "Casualization" and subcontracting
are predominant in the Philippines, whereas voluntary retirement schemes
and greenfield strategies are predominant in India; union avoidance and
suppression strategies have increased in both countries. In this regard, India
exhibits a much greater variation than the Philippines.
Functional flexibility strategies appear to predominate in Singapore and
Malaysia. Prior to the crisis, these two countries tended to evidence
movement toward an aggressive and new form of HR management that
included wage "flexibilization," changes in work organization, upskilling,
and changes in work processes. In Malaysia, for example, in the electronics
industry there has been a movement toward the recruitment of higher-
skilled labor that can participate in the newer production processes, with
much higher wages and the provision of job security and other benefits, but
in a nonunion environment. Its tight labor markets are also a source of
pressure for functional flexibility and skill improvement in Malaysia.
Our analysis suggests that China is experiencing increased external labor
market flexibility and at the firm level has been witnessing increases in both
functional and numerical flexibility ever since deregulation of the economy.
In South Korea as well, both numerical and functional flexibility are being
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enhanced at the level of the firm. Previously, South Korean companies had
attempted to restructure to achieve more functional flexibility given the
increases in labor costs in the 1987-1991 period, but some also adopted
numerical flexibility strategies such as the movement of production out of
the country to lower-cost regions. The financial crisis has driven a more
urgent imperative for flexibility of both types.
The nature of IR change in Japan has focused almost exclusively on the
reduction of head count during the 1990s. This focus on numerical flexibility
has been realized through greater use of subcontracting, increases in the
ratio of temporary to permanent workers, increased voluntary retirements,
higher incidences of interfirm transfers, lower hiring levels, and some
changes in the commitment to lifetime employment. However, we note that
the changes relate to "how much" (and for how long) labor is employed,
not "how" labor is used; i.e., the focus on numerical flexibility comes over
and above the large extent of functional flexibility for which the Japanese
IR system is famous and reflects the breakdown of the more rigid aspects of
the system.
What influenced the choice of different flexibility strategies in these
nations, particularly before the crisis? Although our cases do not suggest a
definitive answer to this question, we can identify four interrelated factors
that appear to be associated with the choice of flexibility strategies. First,
there appears to be some evidence that the greater the extent of institutional
arrangements in states that have placed a high emphasis on job security in
the past, the greater is the proclivity to use numerical flexibility strategies as
an initial step. This seems to have been true even where the ability to layoff
or retrench employees remained constrained. For example, the Indian IR
system is an example of extreme rigidity before economic liberalization, and
that rigidity, particularly in terms of the inability to layoff or retrench, was
seen as a barrier to effective restructuring to meet the newly emerging
international competition after liberalization. Given this, the use of
voluntary retirement schemes and the adoption of greenfield strategies
predominated (Hiers and Kuruvilla 2000). The Japanese system as well, was
functionally flexible within the firm but extremely rigid in general labor
market terms, and the recession, excess capacity, the movement of factories
to' Southeast Asia, and growth of the service sector have exerted their
pressures for change. Numerical flexibility approaches were seen as initial
adjustments. Thus, whether or not there has been some form of functional
flexibility in the past, numerical approaches appear to be more likely where
there has been a previous strong emphasis on job security.
A second factor driving the adoption of different flexibility strategies
pertains to the source of competitive advantage of different nations and
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firms. Deyo (1997) argued that numerical flexibility strategies will tend to
predominate in firms in exceptionally competitive product niches. Both low-
and high-cost product niches exist. Our own view is that numerical
flexibility strategies tend to dominate in countries and industries where the
source of competitive advantage is low labor costs. Some support for this
argument can be seen in the case of the export industries of the Philippines,
notably in garments and shoes, and similar low-cost industries in India. In
firms and nations that seek to capitalize on low costs, there is little incentive
to invest in long-term training and continuous upskilling, associated with
functional flexibility. The Philippines' continued focus on low costs thus led
to an emphasis on numerical flexibility strategies despite the absence of a
particularly rigid IR system.
A third factor associated with the choice of flexibility is the existence of
governance institutions that encourage long-term investments in technology,
research and development (R&D), and HR development. Deyo (1997), for
example, argues that functional flexibility generally is found in states that
underwrite a supportive social infrastructure in training, education, and
R&D, where labor standards are enforced, and where the state provides
incentives to invest in training and organizational development. The
governments of Singapore, South Korea, and more recently, Malaysia
have provided the conditions for functional flexibility in many respects.
Singapore, South Korea, and Malaysia all have reformed education systems,
have ensured the supply of skilled personnel for industry, and have created
incentives for training and upskilling via skills-development funds (in
Malaysia and Singapore) and tax incentives (in South Korea). In addition,
all these governments have funded massive infrastructure projects necessary
for competing in a global economy. In contrast, both the Philippines and
India suffer from an infrastructure shortage that hinders development, and
to a large extent, governments in these two nations have not created
institutions that will promote the growth of functional flexibility.
Unions, the fourth factor, also playa role in influencing this kind of
flexibility strategy, although the extent of functional flexibility and union
strength does not seem to be related in a predictable manner across the
countries in our sample. It is reasonable to expect that strong unions will
push firms and countries in the direction of functional flexibility strategies.
It is true that stronger unions in South Korea have affected, and continue to
influence, the ability of Korean chaebols to adopt numerical flexibility
strategies before the economic crisis despite the obvious need of the chaebols
to cut labor costs. Firm-level evidence in South Korea and more recently in
some firms in the Philippines tends to suggest support for this notion; i.e.,
negotiations regarding head count have been attempted in several firms
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since the early 1990s with little success. It was only after the onset of the
economic crisis and the consequent erosion in union bargaining power that
numerical flexibility strategies were adopted. In Japan, it could be argued
that unions were strong in the 1960s and 1970s, which encouraged the
growth of functional flexibility, but over the 1990s, their declining strength
appears to coincide with a focus on numerical flexibility strategies. Note
also, however, that functional flexibility strategies sometimes have appeared
where unions are weaker (Singapore and Malaysia), whereas numerical
flexibility strategies have been adopted where unions are stronger (Japan
and India). Thus the precise way in which unions influence the choice of
flexibility strategies is not obvious (at least at the national level of analysis)
and perhaps requires a more detailed historical analysis in each nation.
There is evidence, however, in studies of industries and firms that unions
have had an impact on decisions regarding flexibility. Recently, to counter
the effects of numerical flexibility, unions in many countries have made
attempts to merge to try to centralize bargaining arrangements (e.g., Korea,
Philippines), although these efforts are tentative. Further, there is little in
the way of transnational bargaining that might counter the numerical
flexibility strategies of employers.
As noted earlier, all these factors impinge on the type of overall flexibility
strategy undertaken, and their relative importance varies across countries,
industries, and firms. Moreover, although we have discussed these four fac-
tors separately, it is important to note that they tend to work in conjunction.
Change versus transformation. Clearly, there have been changes in Asian
IR systems. We have argued that the most salient constraint facing the
actors in the systems has changed from the need to maintain labor peace
and industrial stability to the need to enhance firm-level competitiveness by
promoting numerical and functional flexibility. The key question that we
wish to address here is whether these changes amount to a "transformation"
underway in Asian IR systems. Note that similar changes in the advanced
industrial nations have led authors to argue for the existence of
fundamental transformations in IR, a topic that is debated hotly. Since
the changes in IR in many countries in Asia appear to be driven by some of
the same factors as in the advanced industrialized nations outside the region
(i.e., reduced rents due to increased competition), it is relevant to ask the
question here as well.
We use a recent article on the nature of IR transformation by Erickson
and Kuruvilla (l998a) to interpret the changes in Asian IR. According to
their framework, the key element in deciding whether a transformation has
occurred is whether there has there been a serious reconsideration by the
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key actors of the deep structure of the IR system: the network of
fundamental, interdependent choices that determines the basic configur-
ation into which the system's units are organized. Any change that does not
involve a change in deep structure cannot be labeled transformation.
Applying this schema to these country cases, we find the following: Three of
the systems have adapted to meet newly salient constraints without
significant changes in underlying deep structure (Singapore, Malaysia,
and the Philippines), whereas two others show tentative evidence of
transformation (India and Japan) and two others show more unambiguous
evidence of transformation (South Korea and China).
For instance, in the case of South Korea, a wide range of evidence
suggests that a transformation is underway. After democratization, there
was a reconsideration of IR policy and a rise in militant unionism and wage
levels, but the government's response, on the one hand, encouraged the
growth of new unions and, on the other hand, continued suppressive
policies by refusing to recognize alternative trade union federations. During
the period 1987-1995, the government attempted in various ways to
structure bargaining, without much success, and employers and unions
began a process of either dealing with each other or experiencing higher
levels of industrial conflict. Then the onset of the economic crisis brought
about conditions for a major change in IR. We argue that the formation of a
tripartite IR system, coupled with recognition of alternative federations,
granting of bargaining rights for public-sector workers, and legitimization
oflayoffs through changes in the law, suggests a change in the deep structure
of the South Korean system. The fundamental change in South Korean IR
from a deep structure viewpoint is this: For years, the Korean IR system
was heavily controlled by the government with the explicit purpose of
putting economic development over labor rights with minimal voice
accorded to labor. The system that has just been put in place is radically
different, in that labor is a partner in the process, bilaterism in IR is a given,
and the focus on rights is paramount. Yet there are indications that the new
deal will not hold because unions and employers recently have opted out of
the Tripartite Commission. This suggests continued experimentation as the
actors in the system seek to develop a new, stable deep structure.
As far as the Chinese system is concerned, it is relatively easy to make a
judgment in favor of transformation. There appears to be a reconsider-
ation of the deep structure of IR in the state system in China: As many
observers have noted, there has been an abrupt departure from the iron
rice bowl to a more market-oriented IR system. Transformation in IR is
linked to economic, political, and social transformation as well (Jackson
1994).
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So, too, there is some evidence of transformation in the Indian and
Japanese cases, although the evidence is more aI~biguous here than in the
previous two cases. In the case of India, the changes in economic
development strategy in the 1990s have brought about rapid changes in
IR practice. For the first time, employers are on the offensive, unions have
lost their political power as their traditional political partners (the political
parties) have been pro-liberalization in direct opposition to the unions'
position, and the range of IR outcomes has varied considerably compared
with the past. Today, the interests of the industrial employer appear to be
more important to the government than before. There have been several
revolutionary changes in labor law at the state level, although central
government labor laws have not yet been changed; these are being debated
at the moment. Arguably, the shift in some of the basic beliefs about IR
(i.e., from a belief in a very high degree of protection for workers,
safeguarded from layoffs or retrenchment, based on strong union-political
party ties in an import-substitution regime, to a much more market-based
set of assumptions) suggests the beginnings of reconsideration of the deep
structure of Indian IR.
In Japan, the changes in the economy, coupled with the new law that
permits short-term employment contracts, coupled with various new
approaches of firms with respect to lifetime employment practices, are
suggestive of the beginnings of change in the deep structure of the Japanese
system. One could argue that the predominance of numerical flexibility
strategies in a country with very flexible internal labor markets, which had
become entrenched over time through supporting and reinforcing practices
and insulated from the wider labor market, is evidence that the carefully
constructed Japanese employment system is breaking up. There is change in
almost every established feature of Japanese employment and IR practice
and institutions, with intensified change in the 1990s. In fact, in the years
2000 and 2001, a significant number of major Japanese corporations
announced layoffs. Such a breakup might suggest a reconsideration of the
deep structure reflected in the three pillars, although the new set of basic
underlying assumptions is difficult to discern at this point.I5
In contrast, the IR systems of Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines
show much less evidence of transformation, as per Erickson and Kuruvilla's
(1998) definition. Certainly they have changed in some respects, but there
15Wenote as well that in terms of the Erickson and Kuruvilla (1998a) framework, all four of these
possible "transformations" (South Korea, China, India, and Japan) are of the discontinuous type. All
these nations have experienced change that is rapid relative to the past and with great deal of experi-
mentation with new structures.
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has been little evidence of reconsideration of the deep structure underlying
the systems. The changes can be classified as more adaptive and are all
consistent with the imperative of numerical and/or functional flexibility.
There have been changes in what institutions do as well as firm practices.
In Singapore, the assumptions underlying the system have remained the
same: that IR arrangements primarily should enhance economic develop-
ment through the preservation of both stability and functional flexibility,
that the best way of achieving this is to create tripartite institutions that
provide unions with voice at the national policymaking level but restrict their
influence at the workplace level, and thatIR and HR institutions must adapt
and change continuously in deference to economic development goals.
Although the basic beliefs underlying Singapore's IR system have not
changed, the various IR and HR institutions often have adapted to meet
changing economic needs. For example, when it became clear that national-
and industry-level bargaining posed a threat to firms whose different
economic circumstances mandated differential wage levels and increases the
structure of trade unions was changed in the early 1980s: enterprise unions
were mandated. Similarly, while the tripartite National Wages Council
(NWC) in the 1960s sought to promote uniform wage increases to maintain
Singapore's economic competitiveness as a low-wage manufacturing center,
with the imperative of functional flexibility in the 1980s and 1990s, the NWC
now promotes flexible pay strategies for different industries and firms and
takes the lead in disseminating information about pay linked to productivity.
Yet there is little evidence of reconsideration of deep structure.
In Malaysia, as Hiers and Arudsothy (1999) have suggested, the deep
structure of the system is premised on a government-business collabor-
ation that has sought to systematically exclude labor from the decision-
making process at the national level and to facilitate both numerical and
functional flexibility by limiting labor voice through a number of different
mechanisms. This formed the basis for the government's highly interven-
tionist IR strategy during the period of export-oriented industrialization
and its later strategy of encouraging functional flexibility through the
creation of new institutions for skills development while attempting to
ensure that the electronics sector remained nonunion. The one significant
change in Malaysia is the emphasis on tripartism during the Asian
economic crisis, which may be suggestive of the beginnings of a
reconsideration of the existing deep structure based on government-
employer autarchy. However, it appears to this point that tripartism has
very limited objectives: to alleviate unemployment, to promote functional
flexibility, and to restrain social unrest in the wake of economic
restructuring.
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In the Philippines, the basic underlying concept of a pluralistjc IR system
has remained essentially unchanged, although it was suspended temporarily
under the Marcos regime. The pluralistic system has resulted in weak and
politically oriented unions through the historical development of a highly
fragmented labor movement that continues to this day. Over the years, the
low-cost export-oriented industrialization strategy and a huge labor surplus
have weakened unions to a considerable extent, and the new electronics
industry is largely nonunion. The post-Marcos era thus has seen a return to a
pluralistic and democratic yet highly fragmented IR system, with employers
in large sectors of the economy mostly free to pursue nonunion strategies with
little interference, much as in the United States. The emphasis on tripartism
during the Asian economic crisis has been, as in the Malaysian case, highly
limited to date. Thus we argue that minimal reconsideration of deep structure
has occurred in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines; the basic social
bargain as regards IR has not changed fundamentally in these countries.
Why do some of these systems adapt within the context of a stable deep
structure and others transform? Although we do not have a definitive
answer to this question, our cases suggest the basis for the development of
an initial hypothesis in this regard. The adapters (Singapore, Malaysia, and
the Philippines) are characterized by strong and activist states (Singapore
and Malaysia) and/or strong employers (Malaysia and the Philippines) and
either incorporated (Singapore) or weak unions (Malaysia and the
Philippines) with a relatively stable economic environment. The transform-
ers are nations whose economic environments have changed radically (India
and China) or which are characterized by a combination of a strong state,
strong employers, and strong unions (South Korea). We leave the testing of
this tentative hypothesis to future research.
Conclusion
Our examination of a limited but representative set of Asian nations
suggests that changes in IR during the 1980s and 1990s reflect the process of
adjustment from a previously salient constraint (labor peace and industrial
stability) to the new imperative of enhancing firm-level competitiveness
through numerical and functional flexibility. The recent changes in Asian IR
systems have been similar to those which have occurred in the West in that
the emphasis has shifted to achieving various kinds of flexibility, although
the already decentralized Asian systems have not experienced significant
further decentralization. The flexibility-enhancing strategies followed by the
different Asian systems, whether numerical or functional, appear to be
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mediated by the current and previous levels of IR system rigidity, sources of
competitive advantage of firms, state policies and institutions, and labor
unions. In some countries, the changes in IR suggest a transformation,
reflecting a serious reconsideration of the deep structure of IR, whereas
other nations have adapted to the changed constraints more smoothly and
without fundamental reconsideration of the underlying logic of those
systems. In general, the shift in constraints, attributable to increased
competitive pressure, is pushing IR arrangements in Asia in the sam~
direction as it has in the West, which suggests the possibility of convergence.
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